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REASONABLE RELATION REASSESSED: THE
EXAMINATION OF PRIVATE DOCUMENTS BY
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
"'for knowledge itself is power"'
INTRODUCTION
In the attempt to bring complex patterns of social and economic
interaction under effective public control, Congress has relied increas-
ingly on federal regulatory agencies.2 These agencies can fulfill their
statutory missions only if they possess adequate information to deter-
mine both when exercise of their substantive powers would be appro-
priate and what form that exercise should assume. Without knowl-
edge of the actual conditions prevalent in the areas committed to their
supervision, agencies can act only capriciously.
Of necessity, much of the data needed by regulatory agencies
must be obtained from the regulated individuals or companies them-
selves. Although such information often is supplied voluntarily,3 diffi-
cult legal problems arise when the regulated entity refuses to divulge
the requested data. These situations entail collision of important inter-
ests: the private entity's proprietary rights in the data4 conflict with
the public's interest in effective regulation.5 This Note examines a
major aspect of this conflict: the constitutional and statutory limits on
the demands of federal regulatory agencies to inspect documents held
by private entities.6
I F. Bacon, Religious Meditations, in 7 The Works of Francis Bacon 253 (J. Speddlng, R.
Ellis & D. Heath ed. London 1870) (1st ed. London 1597).
2 As long as a generation ago, Justice Jackson observed: "The rise of administrative bodies
probably has been the most significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values
today are affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative
decisions apart." FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (dissenting).
There are two types of administrative agencies. Regulatory agencies prescribe and enforce
rules legally binding upon private agencies. Nonregulatory agencies dispense benefits under
statutory social welfare schemes. See B. Schwartz & H. Wade, Legal Control of Government
26-37 (1972). This Note deals with regulatory agencies only.
3 See B. Schwartz, Administrative Law 87 (1976).
4 See text accompanying notes 74-134 infra.
' See text accompanying notes 37-45 infra.
6 This Note discusses document examination at the investigatory, prelitigation phase only.
Examination during litigation would, of course, be governed by normal rules of discovery. For
an explanation of differences between document inspections before and during litigation, see
United States v. IBM Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 100-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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Document inspection disputes typically arise in the following
fashion. An agency representative tenders, by mail or in person, an
informal request to be allowed to examine and copy documents held
by the private entity. Sometimes the request identifies the documents
sought by type, date, or subject matter; not infrequently the request is
for plenary access to all files maintained by the entity. Should its
informal demand be refused, the agency issues an administrative
subpoena for the material.7  The matter may reach the courts in
either of two ways. The person on whom the subpoena is served may
challenge its validity in federal court." Alternatively, the agency
itself may sue for a court order directing compliance." Regardless of
how the suit reaches the courts, the validity of the administrative
subpoena will be evaluated by a single standard. The universal rule in
the federal courts is that agency access demands will be enforced if the
documents sought are reasonably related to an investigation that is
within the agency's authority. 0
Section I of this Note traces the history of judicial treatment of
agency access demands, emphasizing the evolution of the reasonable
relation standard. Section II critiques the manner in which that stan-
dard has been employed, arguing both that it has undermined impor-
tant constitutional principles and that it has proven incapable of
rational application. Finally, Section III proposes a different ap-
proach, which, through more careful elaboration of the relevant crite-
ria, better reconciles the competing sets of principles in document
access disputes.
I The authority to issue subpoenas is sometimes specified by statute. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
49 (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1976) (SEC); 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1976) (NLRB). In other
instances, when enabling statutes do not specify investigatory procedures, agencies themseves
have promulgated regulations to govern issuance of subpoenas. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 305.7(a)
(1981) (CAB); 49 C.F.R. § 1100.54 (1980) (ICC).
8 See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1486 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (CAB); 49 U.S.C.A. § 10322(h) (West
Special Pamph. 1981) (ICC).
Before seeking judicial redress, the party on whom the inspection demand is served must
attempt to have the demand modified or quashed through procedures within the agency itself.
E.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 653 (1950). This requirement is consistent
with "the long settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.-
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938) (footnote omitted); see
McKartv. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969); FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1095-96
(7th Cir. 1976).
9 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(c) (1976) (SEC); 29 U.S.C. §
161(2) (1976) (NLRB); 49 U.S.C. § 1487 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (CAB); 49 U.S.C. §
11702(a)(3)-(6) (Supp. III 1979) (ICC).
Agencysubpoenas are not self-enforcing. E.g., \Vearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662,665 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980).
10 See notes 71-73 and accompanying text infra.
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I
EVOLUTION OF THE REASONABLE RELATION STANDARD
An administrative agency possesses no inherent authority. It is
created by statute and can wield only those powers conferred on it by
statute. " Thus, the starting points in determining the scope of access
authority are the congressional enactments creating the various fed-
eral regulatory agencies.
The access powers delegated by these statutes are, in their terms,
sweeping indeed. The first major enactment was the Interstate Com-
merce Act,' 2 which provided that the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion "shall at all times have access to all accounts, records, and memo-
randa kept by carriers subject to this Act, and [authority] to inspect
and examine any and all accounts, records, and memoranda kept by
such carriers."1 3  The documentary inspection powers of most other
major federal regulatory agencies have been modelled on those con-
ferred on the ICC, 14 and thus are similarly broad.'-
Were such sweeping language given literal effect, federal regula-
tory agencies would possess plenary power to examine the documents
of private entities within their spheres of supervision. The courts,
however, have not allowed agencies to go as far in documentary
inspection as literal reading of the statutes would permit. 10 The
extent of the judicially imposed limitations on agency access to private
documents has varied depending on which of two conflicting interests
has been accorded greater priority. Until the early 1940's, the federal
courts believed protecting the privacy of individuals and corporations
from governmental intrusion to be of greater moment than promoting
" See W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P. Strauss, Administrative Law: Cases and Comments 52 (7th
ed. 1979); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345 (1955); Exxon Corp. v. Mobil O11 Corp., No.
80-1395, slip op. at 6 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1981); Canadian Tarpoly Co. v. United States Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 640 F.2d 1322, 1328 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Lehigh & N. E. Ry. v. ICC, 540 F.2d
71, 79 (3d Cir. 1976); Soriano v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1974) ("An
administrative agency is a creature of statute.").
12 Act of Feb. 4, 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 10101 et
seq. (Supp. III 1979)).
" Act of Feb. 4, 1887, oh. 104, § 20(5), 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended by Act of Juno 29,
1906, § 7, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 11144 (1978)).
14 See, e.g., CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1976) (inspection
powers of CAB modelled on those of ICC); cf. B. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 5 (ICC Is prototype
of federal regulatory agency).
1- Among the statutes governing document inspection by major federal regulatory agencies
are 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976) (FTC); 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976) (SEC); 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1976)
(NLRB); 49 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (Supp. III 1979) (CAB); 49 U.S.C. § 11144 (Supp. HI 1979) (ICC).
16 See, e.g., SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (N.D. Tex. 1979) ("(A]n adminis-
trative agency's subpoena power is [broad but] not limitless.").
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effective public regulation by assuring governmental agencies access
to information. Accordingly, during this period the courts construed
agency inspection powers restrictively.' 7 However, since the early
1940's, the courts have thought the regulatory interest more pressing
than the privacy interest and, as a result, have treated agency access
powers as quite broad, though still less than plenary. 18
A. The Early Cases:
Stringent Restrictions on Agency Access
The foundation of the early, restrictive approach was laid in
three steps. First, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not
punish as contempt a witness' refusal to answer questions or to pro-
duce books and papers sought by a congressional committee.' Com-
pulsion was inappropriate, the Court stated, because "neither [house
of Congress] possesses the general power of making inquiry into the
private affairs of the citizen." 20  Second, the protection of "private
affairs" was extended beyond legislative investigation and was found
to be rooted in the fourth amendment. In Boyd v. United States,2' the
Court held unconstitutional a statutory provision authorizing govern-
ment attorneys to compel production of private books, invoices, and
papers in forfeiture proceedings under the revenue laws, terming the
provision repugnant to "the very essence of constitutional liberty and
security" - safeguarded by the fourth amendment .3 Finally, fourth
amendment protection was extended to agency investigations, ini-
tially those involving attempts to compel oral testimony2 and subse-
quently those demanding production of documents. "Y
'" See text accompanying notes 19-36 infra.
18 See text accompanying notes 46-70 infra.
19 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 199-200 (1881).
Id. at 190. Thisxemained the lawv for nearly a half century until repudiated in McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927).
2' 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
• Id. at 630.
2 Id. at 622.
9A See In re Pacific Ry. Comm'n, 32 F. 241, 250-51 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 18S7) (Field, Circuit
Justice).
25 See ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478-79 (1894). Building on this foundation, a series of
cases in the first two decades of this century restrictively construed the investigatory powers of
the ICC. See United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 335-37 (1915) (ICC lacks
authority to inspect correspondence of regulated rail carriers); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407,
419 (1908) ("the purposes ... for which the commission may exact evidence embrace only
complaints for violation of the [Interstate Commerce Act], and investigations by the commission
upon matters that might have been made the object of complaint."). But see Smith v. ICC, 245
U.S. 33, 42-43 (1917) (testimony compelled even though investigation was not directed at
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The most illuminating of the early decisions was FTC v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co.26 After complaints of price fixing in the industry
had been filed with the Commission, the FTC investigated the to-
bacco trade, asserting authority under statute and Senate resolution to
act against unfair competition. From one company, the Commission
demanded all letters and telegrams received from or sent to all its
jobbers over a one-year period. From another, the Commission sought
the same material plus all letters, telegrams, or reports from or to its
salesmen, from or to all jobbers' or wholesale grocers' associations, all
contracts or arrangements with the associations, and correspondence
and agreements with a list of corporations. Deciding the case on the
FTC's general assertion of "an unlimited right of access to the [com-
panies'] papers with reference to the possible existence of [illegal]
practices,"'2 7 a unanimous Supreme Court refused to enforce the sub-
poenas.
American Tobacco stated the principle that later would become
the touchstone of agency access doctrine: 2 8 agencies may inspect only
those documents relevant to investigations they are legally empowered
to conduct. 29  The significance of the case, though, and the way in
which it differed from the post-World War II decisions, lay in how it
demanded that relevance be established. Agencies could not order
production of private documents merely to see whether some matter
of regulatory interest would turn up. Instead, they had to possess in
advance "[s]ome evidence of the materiality of the papers de-
manded." 30 Although the Court was able to decide the case without
reaching the fourth amendment issue, it left little doubt that prior
possession of material evidence was seen as a constitutional require-
ment:
Anyone who respects the spirit as well as the letter of the Fourth
Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to
authorize one of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions
into the fire . .. and to direct fishing expeditions into private
papers on the possibility that they may disclose evidence of
crime .... It is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a
specific violations of law); Ellis v. ICC, 237 U.S. 434, 446 (1915) (demand that rail carrier
answer questions about relationship with parent company enforced in part and denied In part).
Although these decisions involved statutory construction, they were informed by a belief that
broadly conceived agency power would have been unconstitutional. See note 37 infra.
26 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
27 Id. at 305.
2 See text accompanying notes 71-73 infra.
29 264 U.S. at 306-07.
30 Id. at 306.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 56:742.
REASONABLE RELATION REASSESSED
search through all the [companies'] records, relevant or irrelevant,
in the hope that something will turn up.31
The Supreme Court persisted in a narrow view of agency access
powers as late as 1936.32 In Jones v. SEC, 33 a registration statement
had been filed with the SEC whereupon that body instituted a pro-
ceeding challenging the accuracy of the statement. Before the pro-
ceeding, the Commission served on the company a subpoena for
various books and records. The company then withdrew the state-
ment, despite which the SEC continued to seek the documents. The
Court refused to enforce the subpoena. On withdrawal of the state-
ment, the Court held, the Commission lost any legitimate purpose for
the inquiry. 34 Agencies possess no general inquisitorial power; -[t]he
citizen, when interrogated about his private affairs, has a right before
answering to know why the inquiry is made, and if the purpose
disclosed is not a legitimate one, he may not be compelled to an-
swer." 35 Jones reflects the key legal choice made by the early cases.
The Court believed that the contribution easier access to information
might make to effective regulation was outweighed by the peril to
private rights that such access would pose.3 6
But in balancing these considerations the early cases", seriously
undercut the public interest in regulation. A leading commentator has
31 Id. at 305-06; cf. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76-77 (1906) (showing of materiality
required for enforcement of grand jury subpoena). But cf. Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134,
143 (1928) (grand jury subpoena sustained without discussion of materiality).
The American Tobacco Court was influenced also by the fact that some of the documents
demanded related wholly to the companies' intrastate businesses. See 264 U.S. at 307.
32 Some lower court decisions were animated by the same spirit at even later dates. See, e.g..
Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1945); General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming,
125 F.2d 596, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1942).
- 298 U.S. 1 (1936).
31 Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
3 If the action here of the commission be upheld, it follows that production and inspection
may be enforced not only of books and private papers of the guilty, but those of the
innocent as well ....
Exercise of "such a power would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the
public."
Id. at 28 (citation omitted).
3 In form, some of these cases involved only statutory construction. However, it is clear that
these decisions limited the broad language of statutory accss provisions in order to avoid
declaring the provisions unconstitutional. For example, the materiality requirement of AmeTican
Tobacco, see text accompanying notes 30-31 supra, was found consistent with congressional
intent because "[the Court] cannot attribute to Congress an intent to defy tile Fourth Amend-
ment or even to come so near to doing so as to raise a serious question of constitutional law.- 264
U.S. at 307 (citations omitted); see United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 335-36
(1915); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 419-21 (1908); FTC v. P. Lorillard Co., 283 F. 939,
1002-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), affd on other grounds, 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
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observed that agency proceedings to produce information are used "to
make rules, to determine policy, to recommend legislation, and to
illuminate areas that are dark in order to find out whether something
should be done and if so what." 38
In three respects, the early cases restricted the ability of agencies
to gather data for these wide-ranging purposes. First, the courts gen-
erally held that compulsory process was available to the government
only when "the investigations concern a specific breach of the law." 3
Thus, agencies exercising any of their nonprosecutorial functions
could be confident of obtaining only that information voluntarily
produced or already in their files; regardless of regulatory need, they
could not compel production from recalcitrant private entities.40  Sec-
ond, even investigations of possible illegality were limited: subpoenas
were held unenforceable "without a showing [by the agency] of prob-
able cause to believe that the law has been violated."'" Finally, an
agency could not demand access to the documents of entities outside
its regulatory jurisdiction. For example, a subpoena of the Federal
Trade Commission -the jurisdiction of which is interstate com-
merce- was held enforceable only if the corporation under investiga-
tion was engaged in interstate commerce and the subject under inves-
tigation was "so related to interstate commerce that its regulation may
be accomplished by act of Congress."'42  The burden was on the
agency to establish its jurisdiction in each case. 43 This position, how-
ever, erroneously equated the power to gather information with the
power to regulate; the data an agency obtains from entities outside its
jurisdictional ambit may well assist it to better attend to matters
within its sphere of regulation. 44
38 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 4:4, at 234 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter Davis II].
31 E.g., Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407, 419-20 (1908).
40 See, e.g., FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 F. 936, 943, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1923), rev'd on
other grounds, 274 U.S. 160 (1927); FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 F. 886, 887-90 (D. Md.
1922), aff'd, 267 U.S. 586 (1925). But see Smith v. ICC, 245 U.S. 33, 44-46 (1917).
4' Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91, 92-93 (3d Cir. 1945); see FTC v. Smith, 34 F.2d 323, 324-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1929); FTC v. P. Lorillard Co., 283 F. 999, 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd on other
ground, 264 U.S. 298 (1924).
42 FTC v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 F. 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1923), rev'd on other grounds, 274
U.S. 160 (1927); see General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir.
1942); S&W Cafeteria v. Aird, 60 F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Tenn. 1945).
43 See, e.g., SEC v. Tung Corp. of Am., 32 F. Supp. 371, 375 (N.D. I11, 1940).
44 See FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 905-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (for investigation to be
effective, FCC committee reviewing network structure in radio and television broadcasting must
be permitted to investigate "all components of the broadcasting industry and the impact of one
upon another as well as on the public"); W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P. Strauss, Administrative
Law: Cases and Comments 560 (7th ed. 1979).
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A modern regulatory agency could not function under the stric-
tures of the restrictive cases.4 5 Without the ability to compel produc-
tion of information not related to violations of law, agency functions
like rulemaking, general supervision of industry, and recommenda-
tion of new legislation are rendered difficult. And, with the necessity
to prove probable cause and jurisdiction, agencies' attempts to gather
data for adjudication and prosecution also are compromised. It was
this very inhibition of the regulatory process that led to the overthrow
of the restrictive approach. The New Deal and World War II condi-
tioned public opinion to accept the necessity- even desirability-of
vastly expanded governmental intrusion into affairs formerly re-
garded as private. In this changed social climate, severe judicial limits
on agency inspections became increasingly difficult to defend. 46
B. The Modern Cases:
Relaxed Restrictions on Agency Accesq
More expansive construction of agency inspection powers e-
merged initially in a series of lower federal court decisions 47 and
ultimately was adopted by the Supreme Court. The first pillar of the
earlier approach to fall was the tenet that only entities shown to be
within the agency's regulatory jurisdiction may be targets of docu-
mentary inspection. The 1943 case Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins48 involved an administrative subpoena issued by the Secretary
of Labor under the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, 49 which re-
quires governmental contractors to meet certain labor standards. Al-
though the target company produced supplies for the government at
only some of its plants, the Secretary demanded access to payroll
records at all of the company's facilities. The district court refused to
enforce the petition, accepting the defense that plants not involved in
the government contract were beyond the Secretary's jurisdiction s° a
result consistent with the precedents of the restrictive period.5' The
4- "Information is the fuel without which the administrative engine could not operate.- B.
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 87.
40 See generally 1 Davis II, supra note 38, § 4:2.
47 See, e.g., Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 128 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Fleming v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 389-92 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940): Consolidated
Mines v. SEC, 97 F.2d 704, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1938); Woolley v. United States, 97 F.2d 25S.
261-62 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 614 (1938): FTC v. National Biscuit Co., IS F. Supp.
667, 670-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
"s 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
49 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
'1 40 F. Supp. 254, 256-58 (N.D.N.Y. 1941).
51 See General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596, 599 (6th Cir. 1942): FTC
v. Claire Furnace Co., 285 F. 936, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1923), rev'd an other grounds. 274 U.S. 160
(1927); S&W Cafeteria v. Aird, 60 F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Tenn. 1945).
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Supreme Court reversed, holding that determination of jurisdiction
under the statute "was primarily the duty of the Secretary" herself. 2
"Nor was the District Court authorized to decide the question of
coverage itself. The evidence sought by the subpoena was not plainly
incompetent or irrelevant to any lawful purpose of the Secretary in
the discharge of her duties under the Act. .... 51 So, under Endicott
Johnson, if the information sought is even arguably within the
agency's regulatory purview no jurisdictional defense against the sub-
poena will lie.54
The next shaping decision was Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v.
Walling.5 5 This case was significant for two reasons. First, it con-
firmed and extended Endicott Johnson. That prior case had involved
a general contractor, and the Court had stressed that Walsh-Healey
"is not an Act of general applicability to industry. It applies only to
contractors who voluntarily enter into competition to obtain govern-
ment business on terms of which they are fairly forewarned by inclu-
sion in the contract." 5  Oklahoma Press, enforcing a subpoena
against a newspaper under the Fair Labor Standards Act, made clear
that the Endicott Johnson result did not depend on the target having
brought itself within the agency's regulatory purview. Stating that "it
would be anomalous to hold that under the Walsh-Healey Act. . .the
district court was not authorized to decide the question of coverage"
yet to allow district courts that power in other settings, the Court
made the liberality of Endicott Johnson the measure for all document
access cases.
57
Oklahoma Press made additional inroads on the restrictive prece-
dents: it overthrew the requirements that subpoenas would issue
against only violations of law and then only when probable cause
-1 317 U.S. at 507.
53 Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
4 However, it has been held that a subpoena will not be enforced when an agency acts
arbitrarily or in excess of its authority by harassing and persecuting officers of a company under
investigation. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib.
Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Shasta Minerals &
Chem. Co. v. SEC, 328 F.2d 285, 287-88 (10th Cir. 1964).
Endicott Johnson's limitation of the jurisdiction defense contrasts sharply with the early
inspection cases. Even as late as three years before Endicott Johnson, a federal court held that
the agency bore the burden of establishing its jurisdiction in each case. SEC v. Tung Corp. of
Am., 32 F. Supp. 371, 375 (N.D. Ill. 1940). In Endicott Johnson, not only was the Secretary of
Labor not required to prove jurisdiction but also the target company was refused the opportu-
nity to present evidence demonstrating the absence of jurisdiction. 317 U.S. at 508-09.
5 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
s 317 U.S. at 507.
57 327 U.S. at 211.
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existed to believe that violations had been committed.S In place of
these requirements, Oklahoma Press erected a more flexible "require-
ment of reasonableness": 5 "it is not necessary ... that a specific
charge or complaint of violation of law be pending or that the order
be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose, within the power of Congress to com-
mand."6 0
The strongest assertion of the expansive approach to agency in-
spection powers was United States v. Morton Salt Co. ,6 in which the
Court upheld an order by the FTC to major salt producers to produce
"a 'complete statement of the 'prices, terms, and conditions of sale of
salt, together with books or compilations of freight rates used in
calculating... [prices] ... after January 1, 1944."'c,2 Although
citing the reasonable relation test of Oklahoma Press, 3 the Morton
Salt Court was more emphatic in its phrasing of broad agency inspec-
tion powers. The Court began by rejecting the prohibition of "fishing
trips":64
Because judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evi-
dence until it is shown to be relevant to issues in litigation, it does
not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that
the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original
inquiry. It has a power of inquisition ... which is not derived
from the judicial function. It is more analogous to the Grand Jury,
which does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get
-' See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
59 327 U.S. at 209.
Id. at 208-09; see id. at 215-16.
Since Oklahoma Press, both the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts consistently
have refused to consider the jurisdiction and probable-cause-for-violation defenses in administra-
tive subpoena cases. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 52-5S (1964); United States
v. McKay, 608 F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1979); Link v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 437, 440 (4th Cir.
1964); Goldberg v. Truck Drivers Local 299, 293 F.2d 807, 809-12 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 36S
U.S. 938 (1961) (all dealing with probable cause to believe the existence of a violation of law):
United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018
(1980); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 39S U.S.
958 (1970); United States v. Marshall Durbin & Co., 363 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1966); Freeman v.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 248 F. Supp. 487, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1965); FCC v. Cohn, 154 F.
Supp. 899, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (jurisdiction defense cases).
61 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
Id. at 637.
Id. at 652-53.
64 See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-07 (1924), discussed at text
accompanying notes 26-31 supra.
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evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is
being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is
not. 
5
Agencies could demand to inspect corporate documents based on
"nothing more than official curiosity" and merely "to satisfy them-
selves that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and the
public interest." 66
In the space of a quarter century, the restrictive approach was
entirely overthrown.6 7 The revolution wrought by Endicott Johnson,
Oklahoma Press, and Morton Salt operated both doctrinally and phil-
osophically. Doctrinally, the Supreme Court moved from denouncing
agency "fishing expeditions" as "contrary to the first principles of
justice"6 8 to endorsing agency investigations predicated "merely on
I' 338 U.S. at 642-43 (emphasis added); see SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous, Inc., 622 F.2d
512, 515 (10th Cir. 1980). The analogy to grand juries is invoked frequently. See, e.g., Okla-
homa Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209 (1946); FTC v. Standard Am., Inc.,
306 F.2d 231, 234 (3d Cir. 1962); FTC v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 633, 640 (D.D.C. 1979), afrd,
636 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
However, the analogy is questionable. Unlike grand juries, composed of members of tile
community serving on a one-time basis and possessing no general law enforcement powers,
regulatory agencies are permanent bodies, part of the executive apparatus of government and
imbued with a continuing interest in oversight. Because of these institutional differences, tile
"guarantee of fairness" implicit in grand jury proceedings cannot be assumed in investigations by
regulatory agencies. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 498-99 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
338 U.S. at 652.
Nonetheless, even Morton Salt does not stand for plenary access; some limits still exist. "Of
course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature
and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory power," Id.
(citing FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924)).
Moreover, the peculiar factual context of the case should be recognized. A prior Investlga.
tion of the salt producers had resulted in an FTC order requiring them to cease and desist from
certain pricing, producing, and marketing practices; a federal court of appeals had upheld tle
order and commanded compliance. The decree directed filing of compliance reports with tle
FTC and reserved jurisdiction to enter such additional filing requirements as might be needed to
ensure compliance. Id. at 635-36. The reports sought by the FTC in Morton Salt were further
reports to show continuing compliance with the decree. Id. at 636-37. Thus, one possible reading
is that Morton Salt allows investigation "merely on suspicion" or "official curiosity" when tile
target companies have previously been adjudicated in violation of the law and the investigation
seeks to determine whether the illegal practices have ceased. Under this reading, the broad
language of Morton Salt would not authorize agency inspections based on mere curiosity In more
usual circumstances. This Note proposes a test for agency document demands which is consistent
with this reading of Morton Salt. See text accompanying notes 245-76 infra. Courts, however,
have ignored the unique facts of Morton Salt, treating its broad language as statements of
general applicability.
67 Professor Davis has observed that "[s]eldom are constitutional changes so dramatic as [this
revolution in rules governing agency inspections]." K. Davis, Administrative Law Text 53 (3d
ed. 1972).
" FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924).
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suspicion" and on "nothing more than official curiosity."G9  Philo-
sophically, the Court reweighed the principles at stake, determining
that the liberty interest that once had predominated now must yield to
the need to facilitate public regulation of the economy and society. An
explicit policy decision underlies the expansive conception of agency
access powers: "those who [are] trying to carry out [regulatory] pro-
grams... [must] have access to the information that [is] absolutely
essential to make the programs effective. '" 70
The rubric of this expansive intuition is the reasonable relation
rule,7 ' which requires that "an [agency's] investigative demand be
reasonably definite and reasonably relevant to some proper investiga-
tive purpose. ' 72  This rule is now followed virtually uniformly in
administrative access decisions. 7
3
" United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. at 642, 652; see text accompanying notes 64-66
supra.
70 1 Davis II, supra note 38, § 4:2, at 28. For judicial recognitions of this decision, see In re
FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 702-03 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); FMC v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1975):
FTC v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 633, 639 (D.D.C. 1979). But see Burlington N., Inc. v. ICC, 462
F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir.) (ICC inspection powers should be limited by -a narrow reading of [its
statutory authority.]"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
"I Originally developed by case law, this rule now has statutory status. The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) provides that administrative subpoenas shall issue -on a statement or
showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought. On contest, the court
shall sustain the subpna... to the extent that it is found to be in accordance with law.- 5
U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976).
The APA introduced one complication. There is indication in the somewhat confused
legislative history of § 555(d) that the phrase "in accordance with law" was intended by some to
allow district courts to examine agency jurisdiction for the investigation more closely than
Endicott Johnson permitted, see text accompanying notes 48-54 supra. See generally B.
Schwartz, supra note 3, § 46, at 118-19; Mogel, The Effect of a Claim of Privilege Upon the
Subpoena Power of an Administrative Law Judge, 28 Drake L. Rev. 67, 75-77 (1978). However,
decisions have held that the APA was not intended to modify Endicott Johnson. See Tobin v.
Banks & Rumbaugh, 201 F.2d 223, 225-26 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 94- (1953); D.C.
Bland Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555, 558 (5th Cir. 1949).
72 CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1976).
73 Id. But see Burlington N., Inc. v. ICC, 462 F.2d 280, 28S (D.C. Cir.) (deciding document
inspection case without explicitly adverting to reasonable relation rationale, but still noting
requirement of relevance), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
Linguistically, a distinction can be drawn between the -reasonable relation" language of
Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt and the "not plainly incompetent or irrelevant" phrasing of
Endicott Johnson. The latter might seem to imply a presumption that the request is lawful, one
that must be specifically disproved before the courts will refuse to enforce the request. Such a
presumption is less clearly implicit in the "reasonable relation" language. However, no decision
has turned on this possible distinction; in practice, the terms appear to be used interchangeably.
For example, one case relied on both versions within the space of two sentences. See F.IMC v. Port
of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1975). If there is a substantive difference between the
phrases, it is enough to note that, although many decisions have intoned the not plainly
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II
DIFFIcuLTIEs IN THE CURRENT APPLICATION
OF THE REASONABLE RELATION STANDARD
The expansive application of the reasonable relation rule is beset
by three serious difficulties: (1) it undervalues the privacy rights of the
entities from which the documents are sought; (2) it erodes the princi-
ple of delegation of administrative power; and (3) it has proven
incapable of consistent application by the courts.
A. Privacy Interests
1. Applicability of the Fourth Amendment
The fourth amendment bars unreasonable searches and sei-
zures. 4  A threshold question is whether its prohibition applies at all
to document inspections by administrative agencies. The early cases
were clear that it does. As early as 1886, the Supreme Court stated
that the target of a documentary inspection demand by a regulatory
agency may assert a privacy interest, even when the target is a corpo-
ration, not a natural person, and even though the search is only
constructive or figurative, not actual, because the inspectors do not
physically enter the corporation's premises.75 Subsequent cases con-
firmed this position.7
irrelevant formulation, see, e.g., FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1098 (7th Cir. 1976); Moore
Business Forms, Inc. v. FTC, 307 F.2d 188, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1962); FTC v. Standard Am., Inc.,
306 F.2d 231, 234-35 (3d Cir. 1962), the majority have spoken instead of reasonable relevance,
see, e.g., SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1071 (1979); Southern Ry. v. ICC, 553 F.2d 1345, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Midwest
Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 461 (9th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch
Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1053 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
74 The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
75 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("it is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the [violation of the fourth amendment)... but
any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private papers to be
used as evidence [against him]") (dictum).
7' See, e.g., FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924); United States v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 335-37 (1915); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 479 (1894).
Although American Tobacco and Louisville & N.R.R. were not constitutional decisions, It Is
clear that in both cases the Court narrowly construed an access-to-information provision In order
to avoid declaring it violative of the fourth amendment. See note 37 supra; of. Silvorthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-70
(1906) (both dealing with grand jury subpoenas of documents).
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The applicability of the fourth amendment to document inspec-
tions was briefly placed in doubt by Oklahoma Press and Morton Salt.
The Oklahoma Press Court found the difference between actual and
figurative searches to be significant. 77 Although the Court appar-
ently was unwilling to reject entirely the notion that the two may be
profitably analogized, and therefore that figurative searches are enti-
fled to some fourth amendment protection, 7S a fair implication of
Oklahoma Press is that the private rights to be balanced against the
government's need for information are something other than fourth
amendment rights.79  Morton Salt abandoned this theory,"" stressing
instead that corporations (the usual targets of agency access demands)
have lesser privacy rights than natural persons.8' Significantly,
327 U.S. at 195, 202-03, 204-06. This position had been anticipated In Isbrandtsn-Mollcr
Co. v. United States, 300 U.S. 139, 145 (1937); accord, Porter v. Mueller, 156 F.2d 278. 280 (3d
Cir. 1946).
78 327 U.S. at 208.
79 As the Court put it, these private rights
are not identical with those protected against invasion by actual search and seizure, nor
are the threatened abuses the same. They are rather the interests of men to be free from
officious intermeddling ... .Officious examination can be expensive. so much so that it
eats up men's substance. It can be time consuming, clogging the processes of business. It
can become persecution when carried beyond reason.
327 U.S. at 213.
This observation is puzzlingly incomplete. If -the interests to be free from officious
intermeddling" are not derived from the fourth amendment, why are they legally protectible?
The Court only hinted at possible explanations and no later eases have sought to dispel the
mystery. The Court, however, may have had any of three possibilities in mind. The interests
may have been: (1) subconstitutional, secured under general equitable powers of the judiciary:
(2) extraconstitutional, stemming from some variant of the pre-twentieth-century notion of
legally enforceable natural rights, see 327 U.S. at 203 n.30 (quoting Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438,478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see generally M. Horwitz. The Transfor-
mation of American Law, 1780-1860, at 4, 7-8 (1977); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §
8-1, at 427-31 (1978); or (3) constitutional, flowing from a guarantee other than the fourth
amendment. One possible location of such another constitutional guarantee might be the due
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Oklahoma Press itself suggests this
source, see 327 U.S. at 207 & n.40 (overly broad subpoena similar to general warrant or writ of
assistance, both anathema to Anglo-American notions of " *first principles of justice"" (quoting
FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924))); cf. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 5S9,
598-600 & n.23 (1977) (right of privacy protects the interest of individuals in both confidentiality
("avoiding disclosure of personal matters") and autonomy ("independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions")) (citing with approval Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. 152-53 (1973)
(right of privacy springs from liberty clause of fourteenth amendment)). At least one jurist
believed that the cryptic language of Oklahoma Press was an attempt to engage the due process
clause. In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir.) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867
(1973).
8 The Court returned to the earlier position that the fourth amendment right to privacy -is
not confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking
under compulsion of process." 338 U.S. at 651-52 (citations omitted).
"I Id. at 652. Implicitly, therefore, Morton Salt did not dispute the applicability of the fourth
amendment when individuals, not corporations, are the subjects of the inspection demands.
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though, neither decision held unambiguously that the fourth amend-
ment is inapplicable to document examination demands directed at
corporations. 82
In the context of later cases, however, the positions of the Okla-
homa Press and Morton Salt Courts on the applicability of the fourth
amendment stand as largely aberrational. The distinction made in
Oklahoma Press was stillborn; few decisions in the last three decades
have attempted to resurrect Oklahoma Press' intimation that figura-
tive searches are less an object of fourth amendment concern than are
actual searches. 3  Moreover, recent cases have established decisively
that corporations as well as natural persons have substantial fourth
amendment rights . 4  The major strand of these cases is a line of
Supreme Court decisions dealing with commercial entities. A pair of
1967 cases- Camara v. Municipal Court85 and See v. City of
Seattle86" - refused on fourth amendment grounds to permit warrant-
less, nonconsensual inspections by units of local government. Building
on Camara's proscription of residential intrusions,8 7 the Court in See
ruled that businesses and businessmen possess important privacy rights
that must be protected from unrestricted agency discretion. 8 The
Moreover, while the Court held that corporations possess lesser privacy rights than Individ.
uals, it did not assert that corporations are entirely bereft of such rights. See id. at 652-53. Thus,
Morton Salt did not speak to the key question: are the fourth amendment rights that corporations
do possess, although less than those of natural persons, still great enough to impose substantive
limits on administrative investigations? That question is answered affirmatively at text accompa-
nying notes 84-94 infra.
82 See 338 U.S. at 651-52; 327 U.S. at 208.
83 See Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 461 n.13 (9th Cir. 1976);
United States v. IBM Corp., 83 F.R.D. 97, 101-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). As noted, even Morton Salt
discarded this distinction. See note 80 supra. But see SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrlb. Co., 480
F.2d 1047, 1054-55 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974). The Supreme Court has
stated that an administrative document inspection, despite being termed a "onstructive" search
in Oklahoma Press, is subject to fourth amendment limits. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,
545 (1967).
8 Of course, different corporations-as well as different noncorporate entities-may, be-
cause of their particular circumstances, have stronger or weaker privacy rights than others. The
circumstantial differences relevant to document inspections by regulatory agencies are discussed
in Section III of this Note.
-- 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (housing code inspection).
86 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (fire inspection).
87 The Court noted the "governing principle" that warrantless, nonconsensual searches of
private property are, except in "certain carefully defined classes of cases," per se unreasonable.
387 U.S. at 528. Although administrative inspections may be regarded as "less hostile
intrusion[s]" than law enforcement searches, id. at 530, they nevertheless represent "significant
intrusions" on fourth amendment interests, and so come within the general rule, Id. at 534.
11 387 U.S. at 543-46. The See Court stated flatly: "The businessman, like the occupant of a
residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official
entries upon his private commercial property." Id. at 543.
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culmination of this line of cases was the 1978 decision Marshall v.
Barlow's, Inc.89 Again focusing on business privacy under the fourth
amendment, the Court refused to permit warrantless inspection of
business premises by Department of Labor agents under the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act. 0 Even Justice Stevens in dissent con-
ceded that "businesses are unquestionably entitled to Fourth Amend-
ment protection." 9' In the physical premises inspection cases, the
Supreme Court evinced a heightened awareness of the privacy rights
of business entities. This same awareness surely extends to document
inspection. In See, the Court found physical and documentary inspec-
tions to serve "analogous investigative functions" -92 indeed, the Court
found the settled applicability of the fourth amendment to document
inspection to be "strong support" for its holding on physical inspec-
tions. 93 And the Barlow's Court averred: "Delineating the scope of a
search with some care is particularly important where documents are
involved." ' 4
With the repudiation of Oklahoma Press' distinction between
figurative and actual searches and of Morton Salt's flirtation with
denial of corporate fourth amendment rights,95 doctrine has come full
circle. The position of the early cases that the fourth amendment
governs administrative document inspections undoubtedly is the law.
2. The Reasonable Relation Rule and the Fourth Amendment
Since fourth amendment guarantees apply to document inspec-
tion demands, the next inquiry is what those guarantees require. The
- 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
9D Id. at 311-15.
In two cases between Camara-See and Barlow's, the Court had upheld warrantless inspec-
tions of businesses involved in pervasively regulated industries historically subject to close gov-
ernmental control. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316-17 (1972) (gun dealer): Colon-
nade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970) {liquor dealer). Barloirls.
however, made clear that these decisions were "eeeptions*" to the general rule and
"represent[ed] responses to relatively unique circumstances.- 436 U.S. at 313: see Donovan v.
Dewey, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 2538-40 (1981) (arguably extending Colomade-Bisicll exception to
mining industry).
The affirmation of corporate privacy rights may not be an isolated phenomenon. The Court
now appears to be more receptive to corporate rights under the Bill of Rights generally. See First
Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777-86 (1978) (holding corporate free speech protected by
the first amendment even when not materially related to the corporation's business).
91 436 U.S. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92 387 U.S. at 545.
11 Id. at 544.
9 436 U.S. at 324 n.22.
's Indeed, even the United States government now concedes that corporations have privacy
interests in their premises. See, e.g., United States v. Cortina, 630 F.2d 1207, 1215 n.5 8th Cir.
1980).
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administrative subpoena is, in document inspections, the counterpart
of the search warrant in physical inspections. 6 Both are tested
against not strict probable cause criteria but the looser requirement of
"reasonableness. ' 97 The fourth amendment's "reasonableness" clause
requires a case-by-case balancing approach. The public interest in the
investigation must be balanced against the rights of the target that are
to be invaded. 98
Regrettably, the expansive construction of the reasonable relation
rule is a poor vehicle for the balancing of interests and therefore for
vindicating the fourth amendment privacy rights of entities subject to
document inspection demands. No very precise formulation imple-
menting the reasonable relation rule has commanded universal adher-
ence; different courts have used different language."9 The Morton
Salt elaboration, however, is the one most frequently recited by lower
federal courts. 00 Under it, an administrative subpoena will be en-
forced if three conditions are present: (1) "the inquiry is within the
authority of the agency"; (2) "the demand is not too indefinite"; and
(3) "the information sought is reasonably relevant" to the agency's
inquiry.101 The thrust of these conditions is dual. The first implica-
06 A principal safeguard of the search warrant procedure is the necessity that the warrant, to
be enforceable, be issued by a " 'neutral and detached magistrate,' " Coolidge v. New 1-amp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)
(Jackson, J.)). Similar protection is afforded in the administrative subpoena context by tile fact
that such a subpoena is not enforceable by the agency itself. Upon refusal of the target entity to
obey, an agency must petition a court for enforcement of the subpoena: alternatively, the target
itself may sue to prevent enforcement of the subpoena. See notes 8-9 and accompanying text
supra.
'7 See, e.g., See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. at 545.
The text of the fourth amendment can be divided into two parts. The first portion ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... ) lays down a reasonableness standard to
govern warrantless searches. The second portion ("and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized") prescribes a probable cause requirement for
searches under warrants. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 325-26 (Stevens, J,,
dissenting).
o1 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 329,
335 (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968);
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. at 536-37.
99 Indeed, this Note argues that this very lack of specification has been a significant cause of
difficulty. See text accompanying notes 174-236 & 243-44 infra.
'00 See, e.g., SEC v. Blackfoot Bituminous, Inc., 622 F.2d 512, 514 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 955 (1980); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 864 (1962); FTC v. Stanley H. Kaplan Educ. Center Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 989, 992 (D.
Mass. 1977).
101 338 U.S. at 652. The target of the subpoena, not the agency, bears the burden of proof as
to the existence of these conditions. See FTC v. Standard Am., Inc., 306 F.2d 231, 235 (3d Cir.
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tion is unexceptionable- the conditions evince a preference that
agencies not demand more documents than necessary for their investi-
gative purposes, a preference consistent with the accommodation that
balancing seeks to promote.
It is the second implication that contravenes the spirit of balanc-
ing: the conditions direct that a valid government interest in produc-
tion necessarily supersedes private interests in nonproduction. The
Morton Salt formulation means that once an agency's demand has
been shorn of any overbreadth, that demand must be enforced if it
links to any valid agency purpose, and countervailing privacy interests
must yield. This result is the very antithesis of the case-by-case balanc-
ing required by the fourth amendment; instead, it is the permanent
subordination of one side of the scale to the other. Not even the
strongest privacy interest can ever outweigh even the weakest (but still
extant) regulatory interest. 02
1962). The Oklahoma Press formulation also requires the party opposing tile subpoena to show
its failure to meet the reasonable relation test. 327 U.S. at 218.
Another often encountered formulation is that a demand will be upheld as long as tile
agency shows "that the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the
inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not alrcady within [its]
possession, and that the administrative steps required . . . have been followed ... . United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964), quoted in CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d
394, 402 n.9 (7th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047. 1053 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371,
1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
102 There are two possible qualifications to this conclusion. The first relates to privileged
materials. Whether materials protected by the common law evidentiary privileges are exempt
from production under an otherwise enforceable inspection demand has not been litigated
extensively or resolved authoritatively. Although the majority position seems to favor the privi-
leges, the cases offer no unambiguous teaching. Compare Air Transp. Assn of Am., 31 C.A.B.
970 (1960) (attorney-client privilege does not exempt documents from production) with CAB v.
Air Transp. Ass'n of Am., 201 F. Supp. 318, 318 (D.D.C. 1961) (attorney-client privilege does
shield documents sought by agency). See also FTC v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 210-11 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) ("self-evaluative" privilege may exist in private litigation but cannot be asserted
against an agency's demand for documents); Coopers Express, Inc. v. ICC, 330 F.2d 33S, 341
(1st Cir. 1964); United States v. Alabama Highway Express, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 450, 453 (N.D.
Ala. 1942). Given the importance of the relationships the common law privileges seek to protect,
the better view is that such privileges should apply to agency demands for document production.
See B. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 353-54. See generally Mogel, The Effect of a Claim of Privilege
Upon the Subpoena Power of an Administrative Law Judge, 28 Drake L. Rev. 67 (1978).
However, production to the agency of the documents sought may constitute waiver for all
purposes of any privilege that otherwise might have been asserted. See In re Penn Central
Comm'l Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453, 462-64 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Second, targets often have asserted that a subpoena was motivated only by the agency's bad
faith or desire to harass, and thus that the subpoena should not be enforced. see, e.g., United
States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58 (1964); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 n.39(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979); SEC v. Whe ing-Pittsburgh Steel Corp.,
482 F. Supp. 555, 561-62, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1979), or that tile target should be permitted to engage
in discovery, see, e.g., United States v. Church of Scientology, 520 F.2d 818, 824 (9th Cir.
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Yet the privacy interests at stake in document examination cases
may be significant indeed. First, the monetary cost of complying with
an agency's demand for production of documents can be quite sub-
stantial. Such demands often are extensive. 10 3 Sometimes, the
agency's inspectors simply rummage through all the target's files,
themselves selecting the relevant documents; usually, the target's em-
ployees cull the files in search of the relevant material. In either event,
the document selected may be examined on the premises, removed by
the inspectors, or photocopied. When the document search is con-
ducted by the company or when the company bears the cost of repro-
duction, the expenses of production can be considerable. 104
Second, production may imperil the interests of target entities il
preserving the confidentiality of information. Maintaining the secrecy
of customer lists and trade secrets is of obvious importance, but disclo-
sure of other types of information also can be highly prejudicial to
commercial interests. 10 5 Significantly, once data has been produced
1975); United States v. Salter, 432 F.2d 697, 700 (1st Cir. 1970). These arguments have enjoyed
only limited success, however, because courts uniformly have imposed a "heavy burden" of proof
on the target entities, see, e.g., United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 (1978);
United States v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 503 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D.D.C. 1980); Ayers v. SEC,
482 F. Supp. 747, 752 (D. Mont. 1980); SEC v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 482 F. Supp.
555, 563 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
103 For example, in CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976), the CAB
demanded immediate access to all records and documents located at United's executive offices,
including "(1) reading files, which contain copies of all correspondence arranged in chronologi-
cal order, (2) subject matter files, which contain correspondence, memoranda, studies, reports,
etc., dealing with specific matters, (3) expense reports.... and (4) memoranda." Id. at 395. In
SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071
(1979), the SEC demanded "14 different categories of documents relating to [the company under
investigation, a client of the accounting firm that received the subpoena] over a six-year period;
and within these 14 categories... documents pertaining to 29 individuals and entitles, to '[a]ll
offices, directors and employees (present and past)' . . . and to 'any special engagements,
projects or management consulting services' performed [by the firm for its client]." Id. at 1022
(footnotes omitted). Even the court, in upholding the subpoena, termed It "undeniably broad."
Id.
'°4 In United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 455 F. Supp. 1072 (D.D.C. 1978), tile
target company estimated that complying with the agency's demand for documents would have
required 100,000 man-hours of effort and $2,000,000 of expense. Id. at 1083. Although the
possibility always exists that self-interested estimates are inflated, if the true cost had been even
50% of Firestone's estimate, compliance would have cost the company $1,000,000. In SEC v.
OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Tex. 1979), the cost of compliance was estimated at
$100,000, id. at 1036, although again the accuracy of the estimate was open to question, Id. at
1036 n.6.
105 For example, as one commentator observed: the
value [of privately generated proprietory information] to the supplier is based upon
secrecy. In the hands of the government a detailed analysis of employee dispersal, salary
ranges, job categories and recruitment and training plans may insure equal opportunities
for minorities. In the hands of a competitor, such data may provide the needed edge In a
highly contested market.
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to any agency, its further dissemination cannot be cabined. The
agency may use the information itself in another investigation,'Go or it
may release the information to Congress,107 the Justice Department,108
other federal agencies,109 state and local agencies,110 and even the
general public.' Those who are required to submit data to an
Note, Would Macy's Tell Gimbel's: Government-Controlled Business Information and the Free-
dom of Information Act, Fonvards & Backwards, 6 Loy. Chi. L.J. 594, 594-95 (1975).
Experience under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976), confirms the
importance of confidentiality to businesses. The Act was predicated on the belief that -[ait the
same time that a broad philosophy of 'freedom of information' is enacted into law, it is necessary
to protect certain equally important rights of privacy with respect to certain information in
Government files." S. Rep. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965). The volume of -reverse
FOIA" suits, in which corporate submitters sued to block the disclosure of information to various
groups by federal agencies, has indicated the concern businesses harbor about revelation of their
data. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979) (government contractor sued to
prevent disclosure of data submitted to Defense Logistics Agency on employment of women and
minorities); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Eckerd, 575 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (submitter sought to
prevent release of its affirmative action plans to a priest); Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555
F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (supplier of services attempted to forestall release of details of its
contract with the agency); Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 430 F. Supp. 1093
(E.D. Tenn. 1977) (hospital sought permanent injunction against disclosure of financial data by
Blue Cross), vacated sub nom. Park-ridge Hosp., Inc. v. Califano, 625 F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 19S0).
106 E.g., FTC v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 74748 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
'0 E.g., id. at 747.
'0 See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1385-87 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 449
U.S. 993 (1980).
10' Interagency sharing of information gathered from private companies sometimes is explic-
itly authorized by statute. For example, the Secretary of the Treasury may make available to
other federal agencies and departments information reported by banks under the Bank Secrecy
Act. 31 U.S.C. § 1061 (1976). Alternatively, the agency may, within its own discretion, decide to
share information.
110 In one instance, the FTC had investigated whether a distributor had forced retailers to
adhere to fixed prices for a variety of clothing lines. The investigation ended when the distributor
signed a consent decree to stop engaging in that practice. Shortly thereafter, several state
attorneys general sought from the FTC much of the information gathered during the investiga-
tion. In a suit by the distributor to prevent the disclosures, a federal district court ruled that the
Commission was free to make the information available to the state officers. Interco, Inc. v.
FTC, 490 F. Supp. 39, 44-46 (D.D.C. 1979).
"I The agency may decide on its own to release information to the public. See B. Schwartz,
supra note 3, at 125-26 (discussing agency press releases). Section 6(1) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act authorizes the Commission "[t]o make public from time to time such portions of
the information obtained by it [under the Act].... [T]he Commission shall not have any
authority to make public any trade secret or any commercial or financial information which is
obtained from any person and which is privileged or confidential .... " 15 U.S.C.A. § 46(f)
(West Cum. Supp. 1981). Moreover, the trade secrets exception has been construed narrowly.
See FTC v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966. 971-72, 973 (D.C. Cir. 19SO)
(construing 15 U.S.C. § 46(f) (1976) (amended 19S0)).
Alternatively, a private party might request release of the data under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976). While the Act lists a variety of exceptions to its broad
requirement of disclosure, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976), the exceptions are discretionary only,
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 292 (1979). Thus, an agency confronted with FOIA
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agency have no effective legal means by which to challenge any such
dissemination. 1 2
Third, production in some instances may seriously hamper man-
agement in conducting the business of the target entity. When a
subpoena is indefinite, open-ended, or far-reaching, the target, or the
agency's inspectors, may be compelled to search through all of the
company's files to segregate relevant from irrelevant documents. This
process may so disrupt the files that the company's activities are
impaired.1 1 3  Additionally, when the documents selected as relevant
are removed for examination off the premises of the target entity, the
company, while it is spared the expense of reproduction, is denied the
use of its records for the duration of the investigation. 114  Of course,
requests must disclose any information in its files from whatever source obtained if it does not fall
within a statutory exception, and may disclose even that information, which is excepted from
mandatory disclosure. Id. at 291-92. The private companies or persons from whom information
has been obtained may find it difficult to block disclosures under other provisions. In Chrysler,
the Supreme Court held that the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976), which Imposes
criminal sanctions on government employees who make unauthorized disclosures of confidential
business information submitted to a government agency, does not afford a private right of action
to enjoin disclosures in violation of the statute. 441 U.S. at 316-17. Thus, private submitters of
data are relegated to arguing that disclosure is "arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discre-
tion" under § 10(e) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976). See
generally Note, Protecting Confidential Business Information from Federal Agency Disclosure
After Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 109, 109-24 (1980).
112 In theory, submitters can argue that dissemination would constitute an abuse of discretion
under the Administrative Procedure Act. But this is chimerical. Not only is release almost always
found within the agency's discretion, but submitters are not entitled even to notice of release and
so are not certain to know when objectionable disclosure is likely to occur. See, e.g., FTC v.
Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that (1) a 10-day requirement of
notice would not be imposed before disclosure of produced documents to Congress; (2) tie
Commission's refusal to prohibit use of nonconfidential subpoenaed documents in other admins-
trative proceedings did not constitute an abuse of discretion; and (3) -[t]he Commission acted
well within its discretion in refusing to issue a blanket order requiring that notice be given...
before access to subpoenaed documents is given to persons outside the [investigation]"); Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 475 F. Supp. 1261, 1271 (N.D. Ind. 1979) (targets have no legal right to
advance notice of FTC's obtaining their business records from other government agencies).
1,3 In one case, FTC v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 633 (D.D.C. 1979), affid, 636 F.2d 781 (D.C.
Cir. 1980), the FTC issued 28 subpoenas to major tobacco manufacturers, their advertising
agencies, two tobacco research corporations, and the chief executive officers of each. The
subpoenas required production of documents as to, inter alia, information over the preceding 12
years about " 'consumers' or potential consumers' attitudes towards, beliefs about, perceptions or
understanding of, or behavior relating to, cigarettes.' " Id. at 635-37. The court refused to
enforce the subpoenas as to the two research corporations or their officials on the ground that the
normal operations of the corporations would have been unduly disrupted by searching all of
their files for the material sought by the Commission. Id. at 641. However, it was significant to
the court that the material could be obtained from the other targets of the subpoena. See Id,
"I See SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (stating that "a mass
removal of business records currently in use could have [the] effect" of seriously and unreason-
ably disrupting the target's business, but concluding that the disruption could be sufficiently
minimized in that case). Analogous is Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906), an early grand jury
subpoena case. The subpoena called for production of "all understandings, contracts or corre-
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this is especially serious when records that "stand at the heart" of a
business are involved." 5
Recognizing the harshness of excluding these private interests
from formal consideration under the reasonable relation rule as usu-
ally elaborated, many cases have considered an additional element:
whether complying with the inspection demand would be unduly
burdensome.116  To mitigate the burdens of producing documents for
agency inspection, courts have sometimes reduced the scope of a
subpoena,' 17 provided that production be made at a site convenient to
the target business," 8 allocated the expense of production between the
agency and the target,"19 encouraged schedules of production,' -0 or
approved measures to minimize the likelihood of disclosure of confi-
dential business information.' 2 1
Although helpful in appropriate cases, the burdensomeness ele-
ment falls short of providing the full balancing of interests appropriate
to fourth amendment analysis. Consideration of the burdens of com-
pliance is not formally part of the terms of the M'orton Salt elabora-
tion of the reasonable relation rule.'22 As a result, the tendency is to
minimize the weight assigned to findings of burdensomeness. The
spondence between [the target], and no less than six different companies, as %%el as all reports
made, and accounts rendered by such companies from the [inception of the target), as well as all
letters received by [it] since its organization from more than a dozen different companies.- Id. at
76-77. The Supreme Court denied enforcement of the subpoena because of its potentially
devastating effect on the targets ability to carry on its business. Id. at 77.
I's See Burlington N., Inc. v. ICC, 462 F.2d 280, 288 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., disenting
from denial of rehearing en bane) ("The items involved [financial forecasts] are internal papers
that stand at the heart of management effort, and so long as our carrier operations are rooted in
private enterprise there is a strong element of privacy in such items.'), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891
(1972).
"' See, e.g., FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1098 (7th Cir. 1976); SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d
188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 313 F. Supp. 855, 57-59 (N.D. Ca. 1970),
aff'd, 445 F.2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 261 F.
Supp. 553, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
I" See Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861, 867-70 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 8M4
(1962); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716, 720-21 (W.D. Ark. 1959) (subpoena
denied when target bank would have been compelled to spend $30,000 and to transport records
away from its own premises and when less burdensome subpoena would have adequately served
purpose of investigation).
118 See FTC v. MacArthur, 532 F.2d 1135, 1140 (7th Cir. 1976).
,"9 See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1071 (1979).
120 See SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975).
12- See Exxon Corp. v. Mobil Oil Corp., No. 80-1395, slip op. at3 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14. 1931);
United States v. Exxon Corp., 628 F.2d 70, 77-80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 04 (1SOj;
FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 884-85 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977). But see FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 295-300 (1965); FTC v. Stanley H. Kaplan
Educ. Center Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 989, 993-94 (D. Mass. 1977) (both upholding agency refusals to
grant confidentiality).
,'o See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra. This conclusion holds true as well for the other
common elaboration. See note 101 supra.
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Supreme Court stated revealingly: "It is now settled that, when an
administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the
Fourth Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited
in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compli-
ance will not be unreasonably burdensome." 123 The implication of
this statement is that burdensomeness is not an independent inquiry,
but is to be determined by whether the three conditions of the Morton
Salt elaboration are satisfied. 12 4  As previously noted, these three
conditions ignore crucial privacy interests.12 5
Submerging these interests within the Morton Salt conditions is
problematic. These interests are not, as sometimes thought, mere
stepchildren of courts' equitable discretion. 12  Instead, they are enti-
tled to independent constitutional protection. It is established that
administrative document inspections are governed by the fourth
amendment's test of reasonableness, 2 7 and that the relevant standard
under this test is a balancing of the interests at hand.128  The Supreme
Court has stated that "there can be no ready test for determining
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search against the
invasion which the search entails." 129  Balancing cannot claim to be
complete unless all factors are weighed. Unless monetary expense,
confidentiality, and managerial autonomy are considered, "the inva-
sion which the search entails" is not known in its full amplitude.
These factors, then, are of constitutional status within the fourth
amendment balancing standard, and the failure to formally recognize
them renders the reasonable relation rule, as commonly elaborated,
doctrinally incomplete.
123 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967) (footnote omitted).
"I4 Some courts undoubtedly have been influenced by such a perception. For example, In
Colegio Puertorriqueno v. Pesquera de Busquets, 464 F. Supp. 761, 766-67 (D.P.R. 1979), tle
court recited the Morton Salt formulation and concluded: "As to the Fourth Amendment ....
except for limitations concerning breadth and relevancy, the Fourth Amendment does not
ordinarily restrict an administrative subpoena ....
'25 See text accompanying notes 102-15 supra.
'16 See FTC v. Rockefeller, 591 F.2d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 1979) (reimbursement "is a matter of
discretion" with the court); United States v. Friedman, 532 F.2d 928, 934-38 (3d Cir. 1976)
(court may order reimbursement but no constitutional or statutory provision requires it). But see
SEC v. Arthur Young& Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S, 1071
(1979) (describing the court's power as one of "discretion," but also stating that the power "stems
inexorably from congressional entrustment of subpoena enforcement to the judiciary").
M27 See text accompanying notes 75-95 supra.
'2 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
307, 329, 335 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
555 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S,
1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
129 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
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The difficulty is more than merely intellectual, for the failure to
accord burdensomeness proper stature has led to haphazard judicial
protection of the relevant privacy interests. Many courts, reflecting
the current emphasis that administrative power must be made fully
effective, 30 have been quite reluctant to recognize burdensomeness as
a limit on investigations meeting the conditions set down in Morton
Salt. The spirit was expressed well by a recent decision: "Some burden
on subpoenaed parties is to be expected and is necessary in furtherance
of the agency's legitimate inquiry and the public interest.... [Exces-
sive burdensomeness is not easy to find] where, as here, the agency
inquiry is pursuant to a lawful purpose and the requested documents
are relevant to that purpose."''3 Thus, courts usually hold that an
administrative subpoena will not be modified unless compliance
would "seriously hinder" the business of the target entity; 32- any lesser
disruption than this heavy burden will be disregarded. 133
The condition that demands for documents be not excessively
burdensome is a weak and only occasional limitation on agency in-
spections.13 4  Given the trend of recent federal decisions, that condi-
13 See note 70 and accompanying text supra.
'3, FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (footnote omitted$, cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977); see In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation. 595 F.-Id 0S5.
703-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978): SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrlb. Co..
480 F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974): SEC v. OKC Corp.. 474
F. Supp. 1031, 1036-37 (N.D. Tex. 1979): FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 912 (S.D.N.Y.
1957).
Many extremely broad demands have been upheld. See, e.g.. Oklahoma Press Publishinl
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 210 n.46 (1946) (records of all of its trading in interstate
commerce during a company's history); SEC v. Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371. 1374
& n.4 (2d Cir.) (all correspondence with management, advertisers and subscribers over four
years), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.. 455 F.
Supp. 1072, 1084 D.D.C. 1978) (general manufacturing information, including models of tires
and production and distribution statistics, as well as consumer complaints and defective products
litigation history, all over a four year period).
1 2 FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 882 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977); see In re FTC Line of Business Report Litigation. 595 F.2d 6&5. 703-04 (D.C. Cir.). cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978).
' One court has gone so far as to say: -the law is clear that expense alone does not constitute
burdensomeness, where it is a concomitant of a broad, but valid, investigation.- FTC v. Carter.
464 F. Supp. 633, 641 (D.D.C. 1979) (citation omitted), aWd, 636 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 19SO).
See also FTC v. Rockefeller, 591 F.2d 182, 191 (2d Cir. 1979) (suggesting that onl% third
parties-like banks or accountants-holding records for another may le reimbursed for preduc-
tion costs, not the owners themselves when the records are in their possession).
A decision in the First Circuit relied heavily on the District of Columbia Circuit casXvs in
refusing to impose a confidentiality condition in enforcing an agency demand for commercially
sensitive trade information. See FTC v. Stanley H. Kaplan Edue. Center Ltd.. 433 F. Supp.
989, 993 & n.1 (D. Mass. 1977).
'a As one court concluded: "Respondent in a subpoena enforcement action is hard put to
attack an administrative subpoena or special order on the grounds of undue burdensomeness.
United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 455 F. Supp. 1072, 103 (D.D.C. 19781.
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tion does not greatly modify the principle that document inspection
demands will be enforced if they relate to a valid governmental
investigative purpose. The expansive construction of the reasonable
relation rule performs a balancing in which the government side of
the scale is more heavily weighted. Undoubtedly, in many cases, more
neutral balancing would reach the same ultimate decision as now is
reached. But the potential for undervaluing privacy rights is ever-
present under the expansive view of reasonable relation.
B. Delegation of Powers
1. Importance of the Delegation Principle
An agency possesses only those powers delegated to it by the
legislature. This is "the basic doctrine of administrative law" and "the
root principle of administrative power." 35 Thus, the Supreme Court
repeatedly has held that when an agency acts beyond the sphere of its
delegation it acts illegally. 13  In the area of document inspections,
the delegation principle retains its full vigor.137
135 B. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 151.
136 E.g., Social Security Bd. v. Neirotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 309-10 (1944); see CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316, 322 (1961); accord, Soriano
v. United States, 494 F.2d 681, 683 (9th Cir. 1974); cf. St. Joseph's Hosp. Health Center v. Blue
Cross, 489 F. Supp. 1052, 1057 (N.D.N.Y.), affd, 614 F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Friedman, 485 F. Supp. 695, 704 (D. Md. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 639 F.2d
164 (4th Cir. 1981) (both stating that agencies may not issue regulations in excess of their
delegations). But cf. Stallings v. Harris, 493 F. Supp. 956, 958 (W.D. Tenn. 1980) (citations
omitted) ("The power of a federal agency is of course circumscribed by the authority granted by
congress.... [But] [a]n agency regulation will be upheld even if not within explicit statutory
authority if it represents a legitimate, reasonable, and direct adjunct to the power expressly
conferred.").
'17 The demise of the delegation principle has been widely reported. Judge J. Skelly Wright
observed: "Today, most scholars rank the delegation doctrine together with substantive due
process, nullification, and common law forms of action as arcane notions which Inexplicably
fascinated an earlier generation but which were given the decent burials they deserved long
ago." Wright, Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 Yale L.J. 575, 582 (1972). For three reasons,
however, this conclusion does not disturb the importance of the delegation principle to the area
of agency access to private documents.
First, as Twain might have said, the reports of the death of the delegation doctrine have
been greatly exaggerated. Judge Wright, for example, follows his above statement with a strong
affirmation of belief in the continuing vitality of the delegation principle. Id. at 582-87; see B.
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 47. Modern cases continue to insist that administrative power be
properly delegated. See, e.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 330,
342 (1974) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935);
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129
(1958); Insurers' Action Council, Inc. v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 921, 930 (D. Minn. 1980);
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 745-47
(D.D.C. 1971).
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The importance of the delegation principle is emphasized by the
nigh-universal recognition that agencies' assertions of authority must
be subject to effective judicial review. Although agencies' interpreta-
tions of their authority are accorded considerable weight, 38 it is clear
that "[a]n agency may not finally decide the limits of its statutory
powers. That is a judicial function."1 9 The Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) provides for judicial review unless "(1) statutes pre-
clude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law."'140  Moreover, the Supreme Court has directed
that the APA's " 'generous review provisions' must be given a 'hospita-
ble" interpretation."'1 4 1  Thus, "only upon a showing of 'clear and
Second, a quid pro quo for relaxation of delegation rules has been the availability of judicial
review to curb untoward assertions of administrative power. See id. at 746-47: Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667, 1674-76 (1975). Since the
expansive interpretation of the reasonable relation rule undercuts judicial review of agency
access demands, see text accompanying notes 130-34 supra, the safeguard that could render
tolerable lessened attention to delegation is missing in the document inspection area.
The third reason is perhaps the most fundamental. To say that the entire principle of
delegation has lost favor would be overly broad. What has diminished is insistence that delega-
tions of authority be accompanied by specific standards to guide agencies in their exercise of that
authority. But the core requirement that agencies act only within the spheres delegated to them
by statute has never waned. The erosion of the view that delegation must be accompanied by
specific standards was begun by Justice Cardozo's dissent in Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935). But Justice Cardozo was firm that administrative power may not be applied outside
the area delineated by Congress. See A.L.A. Scheehter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495, 551 (1935) (concurring); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 3S$, 434-35 (1935) (dissent-
ing). Perhaps the most standardless delegation ever upheld was that at issue in Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414, 426-27 (1944) (sustaining grant of broad price-fxing authority to wartime
Office of Price Administration). Yet even the Yakus Court stated:
[T]he only concern of courts [in this type of case] is to ascertain whether the will of
Congress has been obeyed. This depends... upon the determination whether the defini-
tion [of the statutory delegation] sufficiently marks the field within which the Administra-
tor is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the
legislative will.
Id. at 425. Recent decisions have continued to honor the imperative that administrative action
be confined to the area delegated by statute. As Judge Leventhal wrote in Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971): "An agency
assigned to a task has its freedom of action circumscribed not only by the constitutional limita-
tions that bind Congress but by the perimeters described by the legislature as hedgerows defining
areas open to the agency." Id. at 745. The great weight of authority suggests, then, that the
purported decline of the delegation doctrine, however it may inure us to standardless conferrals
of authority, should not lower our vigilance against agency action outside the jurisdiction
established by Congress.
138 E.g., Chemehuevi Tribe of Indians v. FTC, 420 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1975); Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
1' Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 369 (1946) (footnote omitted): see Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1944); J. Honnold, The Life of the Law 379 (1964).
110 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1976).
"I Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967) (quoting Shaughnessy v.
Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)).
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convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts
restrict access to judicial review." 4 2
As is shown by this emphasis, the principle of delegation is more
than a nicety to be observed whenever convenient; it is a legal princi-
ple of constitutional stature. The delegation doctrine and the related
idea of judicial scrutiny are inherent in the constitutional positions of
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.'4 3
2. The Reasonable Relation Rule and the Principle of Delegation
It is no revelation that regulatory agencies sometimes attempt to
act beyond their statutory authority. When congressional draftsman-
ship is imprecise or when new patterns of activity arise that were not
envisioned when Congress legislated, even an agency scrupulously
concerned with the limits of its power will occasionally read its man-
date wrong and exceed its legal demesne. Still, such ultra vires asser-
tions of power are no less impermissible for being innocent. In the real
order, however, such innocent transgressions may be less common
than knowing extrajurisdictional behavior; zeal often overwhelms dis-
cipline, and the desire to tumefy the administrative fiefdom is a
constant of bureaucratic life. 44 When overreaching does occur, and
is not promptly corrected, harms accrue. Traducing the principle of
delegation of administrative power offends the theory of our constitu-
142 Id. (citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-80 (1962)); accord, Celanese Chem. Co. v.
United States, 632 F.2d 568, 575 n.15 (5th Cir. 1980); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632
F.2d 1045, 1055 (3d Cir. 1980); Chelsea Community Hosp. v. Michigan Blue Cross Ass'n, 030
F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1980); Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic v. United States
Comm'r of Educ., 493 F. Supp. 976, 979 (D.D.C. 1980). The burden of proving legislative
intent of nonreviewability is on the agency. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 507 (1975);
accord, Bullard v. Webster, 623 F.2d 1042, 1045 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1975
(1981).
Moreover, even an explicit statutory prohibition will not bar judicial review when depriva-
tion of constitutional rights is alleged. E.g., Erika, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d 580, 587 (Ct.
Cl. 1980), cert. granted, 101 S. Ct. 2312 (1981) (No. 80-1594).
113 See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944).
" A recent incident at the state level illustrates the temptation to ultra vires regulation that
all agencies face. The California State Fish and Game Commission wished to classify two
varieties of butterflies as endangered species but lacked jurisdiction over the insects. So, It
asserted jurisdiction by classifying the butterflies as fish, creatures within the Commlisson's
jurisdiction. The agency defended its action with this reasoning: since butterflies are Inverte-
brates and some fish are invertebrates, then butterflies can be considered fish. San Francisco
Chronicle, April 25, 1981, at 32, col. 3. Neither Linnaeus nor Aristotle, it seems, will be
permitted to stand in the way of enlightened administration.
There are more stanzas in this saga. The state agency that reviews regulations promulgated
by other bureaus invalidated the action of the Fish and Came Commission. To undo this step
backward, however, legislation has been introduced in the California Senate to extend the
Commission's jurisdiction to butterflies.
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tional system, and, pragmatically, requiring compliance with ultra
vires document demands illegally foists the burdens of compliance 145
on private entities.
Unfortunately, the current judicial approach to document exami-
nation does not adequately protect the delegation principle. In Endi-
cott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,146 the Supreme Court, in a proceeding
to enforce a subpoena by the Secretary of Labor under the Walsh-
Healey Public Contracts Act, held that the district court lacked au-
thority to decide whether the target corporation's activities were
within the jurisdiction conferred on the Secretary by the Act.147  The
holding was three-part: (1) the Secretary herself was the primary
judge of the range of her authority under the Act; 48 (2) the district
court could consider the question of coverage only if the material
sought by the subpoena was "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any
lawful purpose .. under the Act"; 14  and (3) generally, matters of
jurisdiction should be raised in defense against any administrative
complaint arising out of the investigation, not against the subpoena
that begins the investigation. 50 Confirmed by Oklahoma Press Pub-
lishing Co. v. Walling'5' and followed nearly uniformly by subse-
quent lower federal court decisions, l52 the refusal to inquire deeply
into jurisdiction while hearing subpoena enforcement actions is "the
generally-accepted principle" in the federal courts.5 3 In place of
careful initial scrutiny, the current approach offers two safeguards:
145 See text accompanying notes 103-15 supra.
1" 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
147 Id. at 507-09. The case is discussed at text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
148 317 U.S. at 507.
149 Id. at 509.
150 Id.
151 327 U.S. 186, 214 (1946) ("Congress has authorized the Administrator, rather than the
district courts in the first instance, to determine the question of coverage in the prdiminary
investigation .... "). This case is discussed at text accompanying notes 55-60 supra.
152 See, e.g., United States v. Di Fonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1018 (1980); FMC v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 434 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Savage,
513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); FTC v. Gibson, 460 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 197-12) SEC v.
Wall St. Transcript Corp., 422 F.2d 1371, 1375 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 953 (1970):
United States v. Marshall Durbin & Co., 363 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1966); Freeman v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co., 248 F. Supp. 487, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1965); FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp.
899, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
1' FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 927 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (Wilkey. J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977). Or, as the majority in this case stated: -As a general rule,
substantive issues which may be raised in defense against an administrative complaint are
premature in an enforcement proceeding." 555 F.2d at 879; see SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F.
Supp. 1031, 1041 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (stating that due process is satisfied by opportunity to be
heard before any final order of agency becomes effective and that investigative findings do not
constitute final order).
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(1) palpable overreaching by the agency may be challenged before
enforcement of the subpoena, and (2) other jurisdictional defects of
the document demand may be raised later in defense against any
complaint issued by the agency as a result of its investigation.
Neither of these safeguards adequately protects the principle of
delegation. By its very terms, the first stage guarantees that relatively
minor agency extralegality will survive until later. More seriously,
however, major usurpations also are likely to go uncorrected. At the
outset of an inquiry, it cannot be said with certainty where matters
will lead. Documents on topics plainly outside the agency's statutory
sphere may provide leads to activities the agency is empowered to
regulate.15 For two reasons, this murkiness militates against a docu-
ment demand being declared "palpably" extrajurisdictional. First, the
burden of proof is on the target, not the agency, as to the reasonable-
ness of the items demanded by the subpoena.'-- Second, because of
the prevailing ethic that administrative power is to be made fully
effective,' 56 even remotely close calls will be resolved in favor of the
agency. For example, one court, after reciting that facial jurisdic-
tional defects may be attacked at the subpoena enforcement proceed-
ing, quickly added: "[H]owever, a court should be reluctant to de-
clare the subpoenaed documents irrelevant. Indeed, the trend in
recent cases has been to permit inquiries to whatever extent is neces-
1 4 For example, this is the rationale to allow agencies to subpoena documents from targets
whose activities the agency could not regulate. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall Durbin &
Co., 363 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1966); Freeman v. Brown Bros. Harriman & Co., 357 F.2d 741, 742
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 933 (1966); Freeman v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 248 F.
Supp. 487, 492 (E.D. Pa. 1965); FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
But, this rule holds only if the target of the subpoena is not also the intended target of
whatever enforcement action is expected to result from the investigation. See FTC v. Winters
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 601 F.2d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 1979) (if bank which received the subpoena
was not the object of the FTC's investigation, the subpoena was proper, as it would be when
directed at any third party; if the bank was the object, the Commission exceeded its authority),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
"'5 E.g., FTC v. Rockefeller, 591 F.2d 182, 190 (2d Gir. 1979); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch
Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1056 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974). Contra,
United States v. Security State Bank & Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973) (although not
heavy, burden does fall on agency to show investigation is lawful and requested information
relevant).
I-' See text accompanying notes 67-70 supra. A number of decisions have reflected this
imperative. One court stated:
It is beyond cavil that the very backbone of an administrative agency's effectiveness In
carrying out the congressionally mandated duties of industry regulation Is the rapid
exercise of the power to investigate the activities of the entities over which It has jurisdic-
tion 'and the right under the appropriate conditions to have district courts enforce Its
subpoenas.
FMC v. Fort of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 433 (9th Cir. 1975). To the same effect, see FTC v.
Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 872, 879 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
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sary to make effective the power of investigation." 15 Thus, the first
of the current safeguards is a feeble check. 15
Nor is the second safeguard of the current approach much more
formidable. First, if the agency's extralegal jurisdiction action is ad-
monished only after the investigation has culminated in a complaint,
ruling, or regulation, the constitutional principle of delegation may
have been vindicated but the target individuals or companies have,
nonetheless and illegally, been forced to incur the burdens of produc-
tion. 59  Second, often an investigation terminates without a com-
plaint being filed or other final action being taken. In these instances,
ultra vires subpoenas that survive the first stage of review are never
rebuked. Third, even when such final action does occur, the target of
the document demand may not have standing to challenge it. For
example, when documents are demanded from one entity but a com-
plaint, based in part on information in those documents, later issues
against a different entity, difficult questions arise. It is not clear either
(1) that the target of the document inspection has standing to chal-
'5 SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1031, 1036 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (citing SEC v. Arthur
Young& Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979)). Or, as
another court stated: "The court has but a limited role to play in the enforcement of administra-
tive subpoenas. The scope of issues that can be litigated in an enforcement proceeding is narrow,
because of the Government's interest in expeditious investigation .... - United States v. Ana-
conda Co., 445 F. Supp. 486, 490 (D.D.C. 1977).
" The result is to threaten derogation of the notion that the subpoena enforcement -hearing
should not be a meaningless formality," United States v. Associated Merchandising Corp., 261 F.
Supp. 553, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); cf. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186,
216-17 & n.57 (1946) (courts' role in subpoena enforcement hearings should be -neither minor
nor ministerial."); Wearly v. FTC, 616 F.2d 662, 665 (3d Cir.) (-courts role is not that of a mere
rubber stamp, but of an independent reviewing authority called upon to insure the integrity of
the proceeding"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (19S0); United States v. Security State Bank &
Trust, 473 F.2d 638, 642 (5th Cir. 1973) ("The system of judicial enforcement is designed to
provide a meaningful day in court for one resisting an administrative subpoena.-).
A good example of the infirmity of this first safeguard is FTC v. Crafts. diseussed at text
accompanying notes 229-34 infra.
1-1 These burdens are discussed at text accompanying notes 103-15 supra.
Courts have held routinely that mere litigation expenses, no matter how large or unlikely to
be recovered, do not constitute the kind of injury that permit suit against agency action. E.g.,
Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1, 24 (1974); Paskaly v. Scale, 508
F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1974). This doctrine is not apposite here, however. Target entities
would bear the same litigation costs whether the jurisdictional defense could be asserted in
subpoena enforcement proceedings or, as now, primarily in suits challenging later substantive
agency action. But, allowing the defense to be raised on the earlier occasion would spare the
target the expenses of production should the agencys demand exceed its delegated sphere of
authority. CL Hardy v. Rossell, 135 F. Supp. 260, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (suggesting a similar
conclusion with respect to exhaustion of administrative remedies).
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lenge the complaint,6 0 or (2) that the entity subject to the complaint
has standing to raise the illegality of the document search.'
3. Rigorous Review and Administrative Effectiveness
The two-tiered process of review currently used inadequately
protects the constitutional principle of delegation. 02 Since that
process is inspired by the need to facilitate regulation, 0 3 the key
question is whether this need is sufficient excuse for this inadequacy.
Undoubtedly, fuller litigation of jurisdictional matters at the prelimi-
nary stage could impede public regulation. Agency jurisdiction often
depends on the facts of the particular case. To hold a full evidentiary
hearing on a jurisdictional defense would of necessity delay the
agency's assertion of its regulatory power. And an agency conducting
an extrajurisdictional investigation may discover information that
prompts a subsequent investigation that is within its jurisdiction.
Disallowing the first, extrajurisdictional investigation would forestall
the second, proper investigation." 4
Four considerations mitigate these fears. First, the fact that liti-
gation is expensive would winnow out many frivolous challenges to
Io In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), a licensed beer vendor was allowed to argue that a
state statute prohibiting sale of beer to males under 21 and to females under 18 was Impermissi.
ble gender-based discrimination. The Court held that the vendor had standing because the
statute was addressed directly to vendors such as the plaintiff and interfered with the vendor's
commercial relationship with his customers. Id. at 194. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff
could assert the concomitant right of third parties that otherwise "would be 'diluted or adversely
affected.' " Id. at 195 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)).
But these circumstances would not be present in the situation posited here. The complaint
or other final action would not be directed against the target of the subpoena and no commercial
relationship would be interdicted.
161 "Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which, like some other constitutional
rights, may not be vicariously asserted." Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969),
Thus,
[a] person who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the Introduction
of damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person's premises or property has not
had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed .. .And since the exclusionary rule Is
an attempt to effectuate the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment, ... it Is proper to
permit only defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated to benefit
from the rule's protections.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 (1978) (citations and footnote omitted); see, e.g., United
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1980) (Rakas extended to possessory offenses).
See text accompanying notes 146-61 supra.
'6 See text accompanying notes 156-57 supra.
I The Oklahoma Press Court was convinced that this is a significant possibility: Testing
jurisdiction during subpoena enforcement proceedings "would stop much if not all of Investiga.
tion in the public interest at the threshold of inquiry .... This would render substantially
impossible [the Administrator's] effective discharge of the duties of investigation and enforce-
ment which Congress has placed upon him." 327 U.S. at 213; see FTC v. Gibson, 460 F.2d 605,
608 (5th Cir. 1972).
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jurisdiction. 165  Second, those frivolous challenges that are pressed
can be dealt with through summary judgment,c, minimizing the
delay of investigations. Third, when the presence or absence of key
jurisdictional facts can be ascertained only by investigation, a com-
promise approach sometimes is available. The agency could be al-
lowed to conduct a limited investigation to determine whether partic-
ular practices fall within its jurisdiction; thereafter, should
jurisdiction be established, the agency could embark on a full investi-
gation of the legality of the practices. This bifurcated procedure
makes sense only when different documents, or a smaller range of
documents, need be examined to determine jurisdiction than to ascer-
tain the propriety of the practice. That situation obtained in SEC v.
Savage.167 The court held that, in an investigation of whether certain
commodity futures contracts conformed with the securities laws, the
SEC would not be required at the outset of the inquiry to establish its
jurisdiction by proving that the contracts were "securities." 'Is But,
since presumably the pool of documents needed for characterizing the
securities nature of the contracts was not identical with the pool of
documents by which the legality of the contracts, if securities, could
have been proven, the bifurcated procedure could have been utilized.
Although the documents relevant to jurisdiction and to legality some-
times will be inseparable, rendering the procedure infeasible, in cases
like Savage16 9 bifurcation of the subpoena enforcement proceedings
would offer greater assurance that an agency's action is within its
delegated authority without threatening serious disruption of proper
public regulation. 170
'6 See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944).
'6 See B. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 508.
16 513 F.2d 188 (7th Cir. 1975).
,61 Id. at 189.
"I Among other cases in which bifurcation would have been feasible were SEC v. Brigadcan
Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1973). cert. denied, 415 U.S. 015 (1974) (determin-
ing first whether whiskey or warehouse receipts are "securitis" and second whether any secur-
ities laws were violated), and United States v. Clyde S.S. Co., 36 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1929)
(determining first whether particular rosin shipments were part of a common arrangement for
continuous water and rail transportation and therefore within the jurisdiction of the ICC and
second whether those shipments were made under a legal tariff).
170 One court has rued the fact that bifurcation is not available under the current expansive
view of the reasonable relation rule:
Although it might well save time and expense for all concerned if the Administrator first
examined such records as were relevant to coverage and then proceeded beyond that only
if convinced that appellant were covered, the Oklahoma Press decision makes it plain that
the course of the investigation is for the Administrator to determine.
Newmark & Co. v. Wirtz, 330 F.2d 576, 578 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Fourth, and perhaps most fundamental, administrative conven-
ience should not be the litmus of constitutional rectitude. The very
reason we have a Constitution at all is that we as a polity are prepared
to forego some measure of governmental control in favor of assurances
that government will not become too powerful. The concept of sepa-
ration of powers, of which the delegation doctrine is a part, 171 is one
of those assurances. We should not, in the name of regulatory exi-
gency, too readily surrender such assurances. If tighter judicial scru-
tiny in subpoena enforcement proceedings might inhibit some lawful
regulation, the coin has another side as well. Defending broader
review of jurisdiction in subpoena enforcement proceedings, Justice
Murphy once observed: "If administrative agencies may be temporar-
ily handicapped in some instances by frivolous objections, the public
will be protected in other instances against the needless burden and
vexation of [administrative] proceedings which may be instituted
without legal justification."' 72  Thus, the essential question 173 has two
parts: (1) when are regulatory exigencies so overwhelming that society
must accept the unpleasant eventuality that administrative action
may exceed the principle of delegated power?, and (2) when are those
exigencies sufficiently relaxed that our system may without excessive
loss demand stricter control of agency investigations? The flaw of the
current approach is that it does not answer these questions; indeed,
animated by a pervading sense that the cause of regulation must
triumph, it often does not even recognize that the questions must be
asked.
C. Inconsistent Results
The law governing administrative inspections of private docu-
ments is relatively settled -there is substantial accord that the rule of
reasonable relation is the controlling standard, 174 that only palpably
defective demands can be corrected at subpoena enforcement pro-
' See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529-30 (1935); L.
Tribe, supra note 79, § 5-17.
,72 Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 515 (1943) (dissenting),
To the extent that regulatory exigencies are pleaded also against the fourth amendment
rights of target individuals and corporations, see text accompanying notes 74-95 supra, the same
response is applicable. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "we have not dispensed with tle
fundamental Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures simply
because of a generalized urgency of law enforcement." Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474
(1979) (citations omitted); see United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 319-20
(1972).
'73 See text accompanying notes 162-63 supra.
"I See text accompanying notes 71-73 supra.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
(Vol. 5(}:742
REASONABLE RELATION REASSESSED
ceedings,175 and that these rules should be administered liberally to
facilitate governmental regulation. 7 Despite this agreement, deci-
sions actually reached in the area of document inspection have not
always been reconcilable.
One example of this inconsistency involves the question whether
an agency must disclose the regulatory purpose of its investigation. In
CAB v. United Airlines, Inc.,177 CAB agents presented themselves at
the executive offices of United demanding "immediate access to all
records and documents located on the premises." 78 Although there
was some suspicion that one area of interest to the CAB was political
contributions by United,1 79 the Board, both during its negotiations
with United and during the course of the ensuing litigation, stead-
fastly refused to specify the purpose of its investigation. S0 The circuit
court observed that since the case was governed by the reasonable
relation rule, the Board had authority "to investigate any subject
properly within its jurisdiction and to inspect any carrier records
reasonably relevant to such an investigation"; I' the GAB was entitled
to broad, though not plenary, access to the records and documents of
regulated air carriers.1 82  The meat of the case was the requirement
that the agency disclose the purpose of its inquiry. To the circuit
court, this requirement is a necessary inference from the reasonable
relation rule. A reviewing court can determine whether the docu-
ments sought by the agency are in fact reasonably related to a proper
purpose only when the agency has and discloses a specific purpose.'' 3
'7 See text accompanying notes 146-53 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 67-70, 156-57 supra.
177 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976).
178 Id. at 395. The demand subsequently was limited to four categories of documents from six
different departments, and was further limited to exclude records protected by the attorney-cli-
ent privilege and certain nonbusiness records on the premises. Id. at 395-96.
179 See id. at 395.
'9 The circuit court framed the CAB's position thusly:
The Board continues to claim the right to search several broad categories of the [air]
carrer's records without specifying a purpose and indeed without having any purpose, and
it grounds this claim on the proposition that it is entitled to unlimited access to all the
carrier's records, with the possible exception of documents subject to the attorey-dient
privilege.
Id. at 396.
I'l Id. at 401-02.
182 Id.
'9 Id. at 402. A second reason for disclosure of purpose is to provide notice to the target
company or person. Notice can assist the target to decide whether it may lawfully resist
production and, especially when the documents sought are not fully particularized, aids a target
wishing to comply to produce the documents most likely to be useful to the agency. Cf. Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323-24 (1978) (administrative search warrant -would... advise
the owner [of the premises] of the scope and objects of the search .... '); id. at 333-34 (Stevens,
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Moreover, the obligation to provide an adequate specification "is of
course not satisfied by the recital that the purpose of the investigation
is to determine compliance with the law. The same could be said for
any general warrant." 184 The circuit court denied enforcement of the
CAB's subpoena because of the Board's refusal to divulge the purpose
of its inquiry. 18 5
The reasoning of the United court strongly influenced CAB v.
Frontier Airlines, Inc. 186 In the course of a routine examination of
Frontier's books of account, the CAB sought access to all minutes of
meetings of the Board of Directors and its Executive Audit Commit-
tees during a one-year period. 18 7  Air carriers are required by CAB
regulations to keep such minutes. 188 , The agency refused to provide
any explanation of its purpose in seeking to inspbct the minutes,
despite Frontier's insistence that the Board comply with United.80
The CAB's position in the ensuing litigation was, as it had been in
United,190 that it was entitled to plenary access without having to
make its request reasonably specific or to show that the request was
reasonably related to a proper purpose. 191 Quoting extensively from
United,902 the court refused to enforce the CAB's demand, holding
that without a disclosed purpose the demand was equivalent to a
prohibited general search warrant. 193
Some other courts, however, have reached different conclusions
on the necessity of disclosure of purpose. Some have stated that no
J., dissenting) (warrant enables owner of premises to verify inspector's authority and Informs
him of lawful scope of search); United States v. Bithoney, 631 F.2d 1, 3 (1st. Cir. 1980) (no
fourth amendment violation since search warrant sufficiently limited discretion of police officers
and provided notice of what officers were entitled to take), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981).
Both purposes are noted in FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 905 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane)
(Wilkey, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
184 542 F.2d at 402 (citation omitted). This position seems incompatible with the statement In
Morton Salt that an agency "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or
even just because it wants assurance that it is not." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S.
632, 642-43 (1950).
185 542 F.2d at 403.
180 468 F. Supp. 443 (D. Colo. 1979).
187 Id. at 443-44.
188 14 C.F.R. § 249.13 (1981).
189 468 F. Supp. at 444. The Board rejected two compromises offered by Frontier. See Id. at
444-45.
190 See note 180 and accompanying text supra.
'1" 468 F. Supp. at 445.
192 See id. at 446.
193 Id. at 447. Other courts have reached results similar to United and Frontier. See Montshlp
Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 147, 154-55 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Hellenic Lines,
Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Bd., 295 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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such disclosure is necessary;19 4 others have upheld access demands
without clear articulation of purpose by the agency. FTC v. Texaco,
Inc.195 illustrates the second situation. The American Gas Association
(AGA), a trade association composed of producers, distributors, and
marketers of natural gas, annually estimates proved natural gas re-
serves. 19 6 In 1969, for the first time, the AGA reported a decline in
the nation's proved reserves. 9 7  Amid widespread allegations that
producers were intentionally underestimating reserves to bid up natu-
ral gas prices, the FTC launched an investigation to focus principally
on the reporting, estimation, and deployment of natural gas re-
serves.' 98 The FTC issued subpoenas for various records from the
AGA and its members; the subpoenas were resisted. The question of
the purpose of the investigation was central to the courts evaluation
of whether the subpoenas conformed to the reasonable relation
rule. 19 9 The FTC resolution directing issuance of the subpoenas de-
scribed the purpose of the investigation as: "to develop facts relating
to the acts and practices of ... [certain named corporations] to
determine whether said corporations... are engaged in conduct...
which violates Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act."0-c
In the subpoena enforcement proceedings before the district court, the
FTC declined to state the purpose of its investigation in comprehen-
sive terms. 10' The circuit court believed that the purpose of the
investigation was that set forth in the Commission's resolution ,202 thus
that "[t]he FTC's investigation is for the purpose of enabling it to
determine whether the companies' practices constitute an 'unfair
method of competition.'- 20 3 The circuit court found this an adequate
194 See, e.g., Westside Ford, Inc. v. United States, 206 F.2d 627, 631 (9th Cir. 1953); Shotldn
v. Nelson, 146 F.2d 402, 405 (10th Cir. 1944).
555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
'9 Id. at 866-67.
197 Id. at 867.
198 Id. at 867-68.
119 See generally id. at 868-78 (majority opinion), 905-20 (dissenting opinion of Wilkey. J.,
joined by MacKinnon, J.).
2 Id. at 868. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp.
III 1979), is the section under which take place all of the Commission's actions against -[u]nfalr
methods of competition... and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,"
id. § 45(a)(1).
0 See 555 F.2d at 905 n.44, 906 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Although the district court believed
that the purpose of the investigation was to determine whether a conspiracy to underreport
reserves existed, see id. at 874, the FTC "maintain[ed) that its investigation (could not] be so
circumscribed," id. at 873. The Commission, however, did not explain what other, broader
characterization would have been more appropriate.
21 Id. at 874.
23 Id. at 875.
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specification of purpose and upheld the subpoenas under the reason-
able relation rule.204
It is difficult to believe that the United and Frontier courts would
have reached the conclusion arrived at in Texaco. The hinge of the
declaration of purpose in Texaco was the FTC's authorizing resolu-
tion. Yet that resolution said little more than that the Commission
wished to see whether the companies were in compliance with section
5 of the FTC Act. Section 5 is extremely broad, encompassing virtu-
ally any practices in interstate commerce and providing the source of
the FTC's routine power.2 05  Thus, the purpose as revealed by the
authorizing resolution is difficult to distinguish from a mere "recital
that the purpose of the investigation is to determine compliance with
law," a recital found insufficient by both the United and Frontier
courts.
2 0 6
A second area of decisional inconsistency involves challenges to
administrative subpoenas as excessively broad and including extra-
neous materials. Even Morton Salt, a pillar of the expansive construc-
tion of reasonable relation, suggested that subpoenas might properly
be challenged on these grounds.2 07  This seems to imply that the
agency bears a burden, albeit not a heavy one in many instances, 20 8 of
demonstrating that the particular categories of documents sought may
reasonably be expected to contain information useful to the regulatory
purpose at hand. 209  Many courts have refused to enforce subpoenas
204 Id. at 876.
205 See note 200 supra.
206 See CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 402 (7th Cir. 1976); CA13 v. Frontier
Airlines, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 443, 447 (D. Colo. 1979).
The Texaco dissent found the majority's failure to demand a more specific purpose "aston-
ishing" and remarked: "this broad resolution could have authorized a subpoena covering virtu-
ally any information relating to appellee's oil and gas business. And the majority here never
came any closer to defining the purpose and scope of the FTC inquiry than this." 555 F.2d at 905
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
Even when administrative subpoenas have referred to statutory sections which define more
specifically the authority conferred than § 5 of the FTC Act, courts have upheld the subpoenas
against challenges based on inadequate disclosure of purpose. See FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781,
787 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Far E. Conf. v. FMC, 337 F.2d 146, 151 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 991 (1965); Pacific Westbound Conf. v. United States, 332 F.2d 49, 52.53 (9th Cir.
1964).
207 "Of course a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping
nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the Investigatory
power." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (citation omitted).
208 -[I]t is sufficient if... the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought Is
reasonably relevant." Id.
209 More than mere conjecture as to possibilities is required. "[T]he Government may not
defend a failure to indicate sufficient relationship of records to the investigation solely on the
basis that some chance of relevance exists or some possibility of relation remains. ... [What Is
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in whole or in part when the agency failed to show in advance the
probable relevance to the investigation of all categories of documents
sought.2 10  An excellent example of the careful item-by-item analysis
characteristic of this approach is Adams v. FTC."' The FTC had
issued complaints against Elmer Adams, Sr., Elmer Adams, Jr.,
Adams Dairy Company, Adams Dairy, Inc., and three major retail
grocery chains for conspiring to fix the sale and distribution of dairy
products in restraint of trade..21 2  During the course of a hearing, six
administrative subpoenas were issued to various of the parties, calling
for essentially similar material.213 Finding the case governed by the
criteria of Morton Salt,2 14 the circuit court divided the documents
demanded into fifteen categories and examined the relevance of each
category to the Commission's antitrust investigation. The court en-
forced the subpoena without modification as to nine of the categories,
limited the scope of five others, and ordered production under the
remaining category without limitation but subject to a protective
condition. 15
However, other authority appears to reject the propriety of cate-
gory-by-category testing of the relevance of documents sought by
regulatory agencies. Particularly striking are hvo 1957 per curiam
decisions of the Supreme Court, CAB v. Hermann2 " and FTC v.
Crafts,2 17 both of which reversed cases emanating from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. In Hermann, the CAB, in a proceeding
against the "Skycoach" air travel system, sought enforcement of ten
required is] an indication of a realistic expectation rather than an idle hope that something may
be discovered." United States v. Harrington, 388 F.2d 520, 524 (2d Cir. 196S).
210 E.g., Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 211-12 (5th Cir. 196S): United States v.
Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (IOGS):
Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803, 811-12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 36. U.S. 677
(1961); First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 533-4 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v.
Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 503 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D.D.C. 19SO): United States v. Associated
Merchandising Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553, 560-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
211 296 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962).
212 Id. at 862.
213 Id.
-' See id. at 866.
25 See id. at 867-70. The protective condition governing production of the fifteenth category
of documents was that if obtaining the data necessitated an audit of the books of Adams Dairy
Company, the audit was to be performed by the FTC, not the company. In addition, the court
made production of all categories contingent upon a general protective condition. The Senate
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly previously had investigated the
dairy industry, at which time the Adamses had produced documents before that Subcommittee.
The court held that the FTC should seek from the Adamses only those documents that the
Commission could not obtain from the Subcommittee. Id. at 870.
216 353 U.S. 322 (1957) (per curiam), rev'g Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1956).
2-7 355 U.S. 9 (1957) (per curiam), rev'g Crafts v. FTC, 244 F.2d 8S2 (9th Cir. 1957).
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administrative subpoenas served on a small, nonscheduled airline and
its officers and principal employees .2 1  The subpoena comprehended
"practically all records, books and documents of or concerning" the
carrier over a period of thirty-eight months.2 1 9 The CAB made little
effort to establish the relevance of this extremely broad demand.
2
The Board argued only that the documents "might be relevant or
material,"' 22  a contention which would have been insufficient for
courts requiring agencies to establish in advance the likely utility of
the documents sought. 222  Still, the district court upheld the sub-
poenas, remarking that it could not "say that any of the documents or
things called for in any of the subpoenas are immaterial or irrele-
vant" 22 3 and finding itself under no obligation to examine with any
particularity the documents and their relationship to the proceed-
ings. 22 4  The court of appeals reversed, emphatically asserting the
necessity of itemized evaluation of relevance:
In order to have the subpoena enforced, the issue as to whether
each of the documents subpoenaed is relevant and material is a
judicial question which must be passed upon by the court. There
are no presumptions that the administrative agency or the hearing
officer has subpoenaed only those documents which are relevant
and material. 22 5
On this principle, the district court, in refusing to decide the relevance
of the particular documents sought by the CAB, "failed to pass upon
the judicial question presented to [it] in the case."' 226  With little more
than citation of cases, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court
and reinstated the district court's judgment, 22 7 apparently rejecting
the need for particularized findings of relevance.2 28
FTC v. Crafts229 unfolded in a similar fashion. As part of an
investigation of the insurance industry, the FTC subpoenaed in mass
218 353 U.S. at 322-23.
219 237 F.2d at 361.
12o Id. at 362 ("It seems to be conceded that there was no showing of relevancy or materialilty
of the documents sought in the administrative subpoenas at any time during the hearings.").
221 Id. (emphasis added).
22 See note 209 supra.
223 See 237 F.2d at 362.
224 See id.
225 Id. at 362.
228 Id. at 363: "[T]he court should not be required to rubberstamp with approval the adminis-
trative subpoenas. Such an action would constitute the Board the final judges of the materiality
and relevancy of each document subpoenaed. It is hornbook law that they have no stuch
authority or function."
227 353 U.S. 322, 323-24 (1957) (per curiam).
28 See B. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 124.
22- 355 U.S. 9 (1957) (per curiam).
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all books, papers, and records of an indemnity company, including
those pertaining to its intrastate as well as interstate business.10  The
district court upheld the subpoena without an examination of the
relevance of the material sought to any purpose within the FTC's
authority.23' The circuit court refused to enforce the subpoena, stat-
ing that "it was incumbent upon [the] agency to establish affirma-
tively its legal power to act in the field."2 32  This the agency had
failed to do. The subpoena was extremely broad on its face, and could
not "be enforced without regard to the relevance of the testimony
sought to the areas over which the Commission has established juris-
diction." 233 Again, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, this
time with no explanation beyond mere reference to Endicott Johnson
and Oklahoma Press. 2 34
So, as to the requirement that an agency show particularized
relevance of the documents sought, the course of the law has not been
uniform. Many lower federal courts, both before and after 1957, "
have insisted on the requirement. In Hermann and Crafts, the Su-
preme Court appeared to dispense with the condition. And, to muddy
the waters yet more, since these cases, the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that the requirement still may be a requirement after all.2
The "purpose" cases and the "particularized showings of rele-
vance" cases demonstrate that, whatever the justification for the cur-
rent approach, decisional consistency is not one of its virtues.
D. Roots of the Problems
The early cases, restricting document inspection, seriously under-
cut effective public regulation..2 37  The current expansive approach,
2 244 F.2d at 895. The precise contents of the subpoenas are described in id. at 8,5-8-6.
As a federal agency, the FTC has jurisdiction over only matters involving interstate com-
merce.
21 Id. at 894.
2 Id. at 890-91.
2 Id. at 895.
2m 355 U.S. at 9.
See Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 211-12 (5th Cir. 196S): United States v. Dauphin
Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129, 131 (3d Cir. 1967). cert. denied, 390 U.S. 921 (196S): hunt
Foods &Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 286 F.2d 803, 811-12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 365 U.S. 877( 1961):
First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1947); United States v. Tesoro
Petroleum Corp., 503 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D.D.C. 1980); United States v. Associated Merchandis-
ing Corp., 261 F. Supp. 553, 560-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
See See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (196"7) ("It is now settled that. when an
administrative agency subpoenas corporate bools or records, the Fourth Amendment requires
that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directiveso
that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome.") (footnote omitted).
2 See text accompanying notes 37-46 supra.
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attempting to correct this imbalance, has been overcorrection. Facili-
tated public regulation has been accomplished at the price of inade-
quate recognition of legitimate privacy interests,2 38 encouragement of
administrative activity beyond the limits of legislative delegation and
judicial supervision, 23 and decisional inconsistency.2 41
The shortcomings of the current approach are at two levels:
definition and implementation. First, the reasonable relation rule is
structurally deficient. The privacy and delegation problems stem not
from sloppy implementation of the rule but from the definition of the
rule itself. Privacy difficulties arise because the common formulations
of the rule intrinsically tend to the exclusion of factors that properly
should be weighed in the fourth amendment balance.241 Delegation
difficulties arise because of the porous nature of the two-step review
procedure now in use.2 42 Second, the reasonable relation rule is too
amorphous. Currently the rule is but a small stage removed from a
slogan, its common elaborations 243 providing much less detailed guid-
ance than desirable. Judges, in filling in the blanks, inevitably are
influenced by their policy orientations. This has two effects. For one,
the possibility of inconsistent decisions is endemic, since different
judges with different orientations decide different cases. For the
other, the possibility of undervaluing one or the other of the compet-
ing sets of principles is ever-present, as indicated by the early cases'
slighting of regulation and the current cases' erosion of privacy and
delegation safeguards.
The need, then, is for an approach that both better balances the
scales between the competing values and provides more detailed and
formal criteria for document inspection cases.2 44  The next section
proposes such an approach.
III
SUGGESTED APPROACH
This section proposes a three-part approach to govern document
inspection cases. At the subpoena enforcement proceeding, the
agency's examination demand should be enforced without modifica-
2" See text accompanying notes 74-134 supra.
23' See text accompanying notes 146-73 supra.
240 See text accompanying notes 174-236 supra.
241 See text accompanying notes 102-34 supra.
242 See text accompanying notes 146-61 supra.
243 See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
244 Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1,
10-20 (1959) (describing the desirability of reasoned criteria in constitutional analysis generally).
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tion only if: (1) the investigation of which the demand is a part meets
a threshold showing of materiality; (2) the demand is not overbroad;
and (3) compliance would not be excessively burdensome.
A. Threshold Showing of Materiality
Morton Salt2 45 appeared to free agency document inspections
from any requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion to
investigate.246 And surely the rigid materiality criterion of the early
cases would stifle a great deal of legitimate regulatory actihit".2- 7 But
it would be unwise to absolve agencies of any duty to establish the
reasons for their inquiries. Document inspection is not insulated from
the larger body of search and seizure law, a principle of which is that
"to accommodate public and private interests some quantum of indi-
vidualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search
or seizure. "'248 That prerequisite has been dispensed with only when
the search conformed with some other objective and reasonable "legis-
lative or administrative standards." 2 49  Since, as will be indicated, no
compelling reason for deviation exists in the area, - ° these same gen-
eral principles should govern document inspections.
More specifically, document subpoenas should be enforced only
if either of two criteria is met: (1) the agency has some reason, less
than criminal probable cause but more than mere conjecture, to
believe that a valid regulatory interest would be served by the investi-
gation; or (2) the investigation is part of a general plan of supervision,
oversight, or enforcement. This threshold of materiality is consistent
with requirements imposed on three other types of searches: (1) inter-
rogation stops near the border, (2) stops for license checks, and (3)
administrative inspections of physical premises.
2- United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950), discussed at texct accompanying
notes 61-66 supra.
13 The key language is: "Even if one were to regard the request for information in this case as
caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a
legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is consistent with te law and the
public interest." 338 U.S. at 652.
It is not clear, however, that the Court intended this language to establish a general rule for
all agency inspections. The singular factual context of the case, see note 66 supra, must be borne
in mind. What is clear, however, is that subsequent cases did not limit Morton Salt to its facts.
See id.
247 See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
'" United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 21 & n.18 (1968)); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979).
29 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967); see Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct.
2534, 2540-41 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979); Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
m See text accompanying notes 270-74 infra.
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The key referents of the first of these areas are Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States ,25' United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,2 52 and United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte.2 53 In Almeida-Sanchez, the Supreme
Court, although recognizing an important law enforcement interest,
refused to permit roving police patrols to search vehicles for illegal
aliens simply because the vehicles were in the general vicinity of the
border.2 54 Fourth amendment privacy interests required either a
warrant authorizing random searches in a given area2 5 or probable
cause to believe that the vehicle contained illegal aliens. 250 Brignoni-
Ponce, on the other hand, involved a less intrusive practice, stopping
cars in a general area to conduct a brief inquiry into the residence
status of its passengers, but no search of the vehicle. The Court held
that this "modest" practice 57 need not be supported by probable
cause; it suffices that the stopping officer is "aware of specific articu-
lable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that
reasonably warrant suspicion." 25 8  The final case, Martinez-Fuerte,
involved, unlike its predecessors, not practices directed at individual
vehicles but a method of checking all cars at a particular location. The
Court held that the routine stopping of vehicles at a reasonably lo-
cated fixed checkpoint for brief questioning of its occupants is compat-
ible with the fourth amendment even when no individualized suspi-
cion exists.2 59
The second area- stops for license checks- is governed by Dela-
ware v. Prouse.2 10 The Court held that stopping an automobile and
detaining the driver to check his license and registration is impermissi-
ble under the fourth amendment unless either: (1) "there is at least
articulable and reasonable suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or
that an automobile is not registered, or that either ... is otherwise
subject to seizure for violation of law"; 26 1 or (2) all traffic is stopped
and questioned at "roadblock-type stops. ' 2 2
-1 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
-2 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
23 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
413 U.S. at 273.
5 Id. at 283-85 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id. at 273; id. at 288 (White, J., dissenting).
257 422 U.S. at 880.
= Id. at 884.
1-9 428 U.S. at 556-64.
2- 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
281 Id. at 663.
262 Id. Or, the police may develop other means similarly "that involve less intrusion or that do
not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion." Id.
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The final area- administrative inspections of physical
facilities263 -is most obviously analogous to administrative document
inspections. Camara v. Municipal Court26 suggested that the proper
standard of materiality is whether "reasonable legislative or adminis-
trative standards" for the inspection exist.20- 5 Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.2 66 elaborated: "Probable cause in the criminal law sense is not
required." 267 Instead, the inspection must be supported by either of
two conditions: (1) some "specific evidence of an existing viola-
tion,"'2 68 or (2) a "showing that a specific business has been chosen for
... search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the
enforcement of the [relevant] Act derived from neutral sources." - 9
In an area as fact-sensitive as fourth amendment balancing, there
are, naturally, many points of distinction among these three areas, as
there are between these three on the one hand and document inspec-
tion on the other. That fact makes all the more striking the considera-
ble similarity of the standards the Supreme Court has forged to govern
searches in the three areas. The distillation of the various decisions is
that, in any of these areas, a search will be permitted if either: (1)
there are specific grounds, short of probable cause but at least "an
articulable and reasonable suspicion," to believe a regulatory concern
is involved; or (2) the target has been selected pursuant to a general
plan of oversight or enforcement consistent with the agency's author-
ity. This same rule should constitute the threshold of materiality
necessary to sustain agency document inspection.
More than a pleasing simplification of fourth amendment law
argues for this result. Two other arguments are compelling. First, the
public's interest in effective regulation is not weaker in the three areas
already subject to the criteria than in agency actions involving docu-
ment examinations. In the "stops near the border" cases, the Govern-
ment made "a convincing demonstration that the public interest de-
mands effective [regulation]," since illegal aliens "create significant
263 For discussion of this line of cases, see tet accompanying notes 85-94 supra.
2- 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
- Id. at 538.
436 U.S. 307 (1978).
- Id. at 320.
2rs Id. (footnote omitted).
29 Id. at 321; see Donovan v. Dewey, 101 S. Ct. 2534, 2540-41 (1981); Blackes House of
Beef, Inc. v. Castillo, 659 F.2d 1211, 1224-25 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (extending Delaware v. Prouse
requirement of particularized description to INS search of commercial establishment for illegal
aliens and refusing to "require the INS to meet a standard of probable cause so unrealistically
restrictive as to cripple the statutory mandate to enforce the [Immigration and Nationality]
Act"); Bionic Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Falner, 518 F. Supp. 582, 5S4-86 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
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economic and social problems" for the nation. 270  In light of the
appalling highway death toll, the state was conceded to have "a vital
interest" in the license and registration checks at issue in Prouse.2 71
And, perhaps most significantly, inspections of physical premises can
be essential to the very lives and health of untold numbers of citizens.
As was argued in Camara, "the health and safety of entire urban
populations is dependent upon enforcement of minimum fire, hous-
ing, and sanitation standards, and . . . the only effective means of
enforcing such codes is by routine systematized inspection of all physi-
cal structures. '2 72  And the OSHA inspections at issue in Barlow's
were Congress' primary response to its determination that "industrial
safety is an urgent federal interest requiring regulation and supervi-
sion. 2 73 Second, the Supreme Court itself finds a strong relationship
between physical inspections, governed by the two criteria, and docu-
ment inspections. In See v. City of Seattle, it found the area of
document inspections to provide "strong support" for its holding as to
physical inspections..2 74
Some further specification of the criteria as applied to document
examinations is in order. The "articulable and reasonable suspicion"
short of probable cause would not necessarily be referable to a com-
plaint; it could relate to any of the oversight, supervisory, or nonen-
forcement functions of the agency. Moreover, as long as such suspi-
cion attached to an entity within the agency's ambit and as long as
some other entity had documents bearing on that suspicion, this crite-
rion would not bar agencies from subpoenaing material from individ-
uals or companies that they could not supervise directly. 275
The "general plan of administration" criterion would entail three
aspects. First, the plan itself would have to be consistent with the
authority delegated to the agency. Second, since no individualized
suspicion exists, the plan would have to have been devised according
to neutral criteria pertinent to the type of regulation involved.270 A
270 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.
271 440 U.S. at 658.
272 387 U.S. at 533; see Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959) (such inspections tre "of
indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health").
273 436 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967); see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 324 n.22 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the fourth amendment concerns applied by the Court In that case to
physical inspections are "particularly important" when documents are involved).
27' In these ways, plus in the fact that agencies could pursue general supervisory plans without
any individualized suspicion at all, the threshold purpose here would avoid the stifling of
legitimate regulation that was an incident of the early cases. See text accompanying notes 37-44
supra.
276 The neutral criteria suggested for OSHA inspection by the Barlow's Court were factors like
"dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the desired
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plan would seem to satisfy this condition if it investigated, for exam-
ple: political contributions by all firms in a particular industry, mar-
keting practices of all retail chains in a particular geographical area,
or accounting methods of some firms only as long as germane charac-
teristics of size, markets of operation, type of business, etc., separated
the firms subject to the plan from those outside it. An investigation of
some practices of, say, only three of the "seven sisters" oil companies
would, absent some germane distinction, probably fail this test.
Third, to prevent abuse or favoritism, the agency would have to
subpoena entities subject to the plan in some routine, rational, and
nondiscriminatory manner.
B. Overbreadth
When the agency's document demand satisfies the threshold of
materiality, a second level of scrutiny should operate. At this level,
there are three questions: (1) how particular must be the description
of the documents sought?,2 77 (2) how concrete must be the agency's
statement of the purpose of its investigation?, -71 and (3) how close
must be the fit between the documents sought and the purpose an-
nounced? Because the public and private interests at stake vary in
each case, no single answer to any of these questions can be applied
universally. But exhaustive scrutiny of all of the facts of each case also
is unappealing. Attempting such scrutiny would turn subpoena en-
forcement hearings virtually into full trials with briefing, arguments,
and even discovery, thereby straining judicial resources and allowing
targets to tie up even perfectly legitimate inquiries for protracted
periods. The best way to answer the three questions in each case,
therefore, is a compromise approach. Courts should advert to the
presence or absence of objective factors that (1) rationally relate to
and illuminate the public and private interests involved in document
inspections, but (2) are facially or summarily ascertainable and thus
do not necessitate difficult, detailed factual determinations.
frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area." 436 U.S. at 321. Those for
housing inspections in Camara included "the passage of time, the nature of the building. . ., or
the condition of the entire area, but [because the plan is general rather than individualized] they
will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.-
387 U.S. at 538.
27 By considering this question in an ad hoe fashion, without regard to the nature of the
documents or the status of the target, see text accompanying notes 280-329 infra, courts have
reached inconsistent and unsatisfactory results, see text accompanying notes .07-36 supra.
2781 Reviewing courts have failed to answer this question uniformly or adequately. See text
accompanying notes 177-206 supra.
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1. Relevant Factors
Four such factors present themselves: (a) are the documents
sought records that the target individual or business is required by law
to maintain?, (b) is the target of the demand engaged in a tradition-
ally closely regulated industry?, (c) has the target consented by con-
tract to inspection of the documents sought?, and (d) does the target of
the demand exert significant control over the market in which it
operates? 27 9
a. Required Records-A wide variety of statutes impose record-
keeping requirements on companies and individuals. Statutes either
may directly specify what records are to be kept or delegate to admin-
istrative agencies the authority to delineate the nature and scope of
the records required.280  The courts consistently have upheld the con-
stitutionality of both direct and delegated recordkeeping provisions.2 11
Even early access cases treated leniently agency demands to in-
spect required records. The rationale- now in disrepute282 - of these
270 Other, relevant factors could, of course, be devised. The four presented here enjoy tlhe
distinct advantage of being derived from existing case law.
2" See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 51 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Virtually
every major public law enactment . . . has record-keeping provisions. In addition to record-
keeping requirements, is the network of provisions for filing reports. Exhaustive efforts would be
needed to track down all the statutory authority, let alone the administrative regulations ....
Unquestionably they are enormous in volume.").
Examples of major recordkeeping provisions include § 20(3) of the Interstate Commerce Act
(current version at 49 U.S.C.A. § 11142 (1981 West Special Pamph.)) (ICC empowered to
prescribe uniform accounting system for rail carriers), § 407(d) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (1976) (CAB required to prescribe form of accounts, records and
memoranda to be kept by air carriers), and the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1730d,
1829b, 1952-1953 (1976 & Supp. 1111979), and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1081 1083, 1101, 1121-1122 (1970)
(authority of Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe bank recordkeeping and reporting rules for
certain foreign and domestic financial transactions).
28 Such requirements have been upheld against challenges based on the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, see California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 45-50 (1974); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125-26 (1941); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. United States, 287 U.S. 134,
142-43 (1932), and the search and seizure and self-incrimination provisions of the fourth and
fifth amendments, respectively, see, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. at 52.-55,
59-72; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 7-35 (1948). As to self-incrimination, see generally I
Davis II, supra note 38, §§ 4:16-:23.
282 The high water mark of the "quasi-public records" notion was World War II and Its
immediate aftermath. The common case during this period dealt with the ability of the Office of
Price Administration to inspect records required of businesses by the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 202, 56 Stat. 23 (1942) (repealed 1966). See, e.g., Hagen v. Porter, 156
F.2d 362, 366 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 329 U.S. 729 (1946); Porter v. Mueller, 156 F.2d 278,
280-81 (3d Cir. 1946); Bowles v. Insel, 148 F.2d 91, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1945); Cudmore v. Bowles,
145 F.2d 697, 698 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 841 (1945). But the unusual liberty
accorded the OPA resulted from the exigencies of wartime, See Bowles v. Click Bros. Lumber
Co., 146 F.2d 566, 570-71 (9th Cir.), cert. denied on other grounds, 325 U.S. 877 (1945); Bowles
v. Chew, 53 F. Supp. 787, 789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1944). Since the 1940's, cases invoking the
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cases was that records compelled by law to be maintained lose their
private character; instead, they become "quasi-public documents --3
bereft of fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures.28 4 The "quasi-public documents" theory makes no use-
ful contribution to access cases. It ignores the substantial privacy
interest in the documents. Private companies or individuals expend
the effort needed to create the required records and defray the ex-
penses of compilation, storage, and retrieval of the data. Moreover, in
at least some cases, the private entity would have developed the same
or similar records for use in its business and does in fact use the
required documents for some private commercial ends. The "quasi-
public records" doctrine, treating such documents as entirely outside
fourth amendment protection, failed to recognize the substantial non-
governmental aspect of the documents. Harsh results ensued. Some
courts held that the fact that the documents sought were "quasi-pub-
lic" precluded any defense against the administrative subpoena.2- 5
Moreover, the doctrine provided an entering wedge for dangerous
expansion of the power of government to conduct actual, not merely
constructive, searches. In one case, investigators of the Office of Price
Administration were allowed to conduct a warrantless search of the
nonpublic parts of business premises because they, were able to find
there gasoline ration coupons that were public property.s 6 In princi-
ple, there was substantial reason to think that the result would have
been the same if quasi-public, not public, documents had been lo-
cated on the premises. -7  Such a result would open "an alarming
vista of inroads upon the right of privacy."288
"quasi-public records" doctrine have come up relatively infrequently. See, e.g., SEC v. Olsen.
354 F.2d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1965); Coopers Express, Inc. v. ICC, 330 F.2d 33S. 340-41 (ist Cir.
1964); United States v. Pine Valley Poultry Distribs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 455, 456-57 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
See, e.g., Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992. 996 (6th Cir. 1043).
28: See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (ISSO).
See, e.g., Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 392 (T7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940) ("Respondent is required by the [Fair Labor Standards] Act and
regulations to have the information available in some form to be determined by the respondent.
That is sufficient [to dispose of the challenge to the subpoena].").
'" Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
2.7 The Government bad argued: "Whenever the government validly regulates any business
and includes in its regulation a valid requirement that records be kept which shall be open to
official inspection, then refusal to produce the records for such inspection authorizes the officers
to enter the premises and seize the records." United States v. Davis, 151 F.2d 140. 144 j2d Cir.
1945) (Frank, J., concurring), aff'd, 328 U.S. 582, 594 (1946). Concern that quasi-public records
would be treated like public property also emerged in the Dads dissent. See 328 U.S. at 602
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
28s 328 U.S. at 602 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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Although the "quasi-public records" notion went too far, the fact
that the documents sought are ones required by law to be maintained
is relevant to determining whether the demand is overly broad. This is
so for three reasons. First, only a minimal privacy right exists as to
required records. The key issue in fourth amendment analysis is
whether the company or person objecting to the government's investi-
gation possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy as to the material
subject to the investigation. 2 9  There can be only lesser justifiable
reliance on an expectation of privacy when the person or company is
warned by statute or regulation that the government is especially
likely to order production of the records.29 0  So, the first reason to
restrain administrative inspection of documents, fourth amendment
privacy concerns, is less compelling when the documents to be in-
spected are required records.
The second concern about agency inspection demands, the fear
that the agency will overstep the limits of its delegated power, also is
less powerful when required records are involved. If the inspection
demand is confined to records required to be maintained, and the
recordkeeping regulation itself is valid, there is greater assurance that
the inspection is within the sphere of the authority delegated by
Congress to the agency.2 91  Moreover, recordkeeping requirements
define in advance of the inspection demand the area of particular
regulatory interest. This definition both enables the target of a pro-
duction demand to comply more easily and accurately with the de-
mand and permits the reviewing court to ascertain whether the de-
mand was proper.29 2  Thus, a lesser potential for agency abuse of
281 E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7
(1977); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1,
14 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973); Mancusi v, DeForte, 392 U.S.
364, 368 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
290 See United States v. McCoy, 492 F. Supp. 540, 543-44 (M.D. Fla. 1980) (customshouse
broker had minimal expectation of privacy in records required by regulations to be kept), ef.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (key question In fourth
amendment challenge to bugging of telephone booth was whether caller justifiably relied on the
privacy of the booth).
29, See United States v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 503 F. Supp. 868, 873 (D.D.C. 1980)
(enforcing even "unusually broad" subpoena as to all records target was required by regulations
to maintain).
292 It is precisely these goals that lie behind the insistence of most courts that the agency's
inspection demand be reasonably definite and particular. See text accompanying notes 207-15
supra.
There is an additional benefit of the definition that recordkeeping requirements provide,
Since target entities can reasonably expect required documents to be examined, they are warned
to keep material protected by a common law privilege, see generally note 102 supra, physically
separate from the required records. As a result, the chance that the privileged matter will be
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power inheres in production demands confined to documents required
to be maintained..2 93
Finally, it can be persuasively argued that the public interest in
regulation is more powerful than usual when an agency seeks to
inspect required records. A statute that specifies directly which rec-
ords are to be maintained or that permits an administrative agency to
make that specification reflects a legislative judgment that effective
regulation necessitates unusually ready access to some kinds of infor-
mation. When Congress believes that such access is necessary in order
that agencies be able to effectively discharge their statutory responsi-
bilities, the courts should be reluctant to dispute that judgment.294
When the objects of an agency's inspection demand are records
that statute or regulation mandates the target entity to maintain, the
reasons urging restraint of administrative power are weaker than
usual and the reasons favoring facilitated governmental activity are
stronger. Thus, when this factor is present courts should be loath to
find the relevant portion of the document demand to be overly broad;
less particularization of documents or of purpose and a looser fit
between the two are tolerable.
b. Traditionally Closely Regulated Industries- Historically,
firms in particular industries have been subjected to more than nor-
mally stringent governmental supervision. When a firm in one of
these industries is the target of an agency's demand to inspect docu-
ments, the same three reasons are present as countenanced easy
agency access to required records.2 -5
First, privacy concerns operate less strongly. There is a three-
level hierarchy for fourth amendment purposes. First, historically
pervasively regulated industries -apparently only the liquor and gun
trades-have only minimal privacy rights. Second, other industries
closely regulated-yet less so than alcohol and firearms-have some-
what greater, yet still curtailed, privacy rights. Third, businesses
subject to only laws of general applicability have undiminished corpo-
rate privacy rights.
inadvertently produced along with the required material, thereby forfeiting the privilege, see
id., will be reduced.
29 Professor Davis has remarked that "regulations of general applicability which prescribe in
advance the type of information open to administrative scrutiny may well be regarded as less
dangerous than power to command a particular party to disclose information which the agency
seeks for special purposes." 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 177 (1st ed. 195S) [hereinaf-
ter Davis I].
29 See, e.g., ICC v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194, 209-16 (1912); Baltimore & O.R.R.
v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612, 622 (1911).
25 See text accompanying notes 289-94 supra.
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As to the first level, in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States,2 96 the Supreme Court held that liquor dealers-heavily regu-
lated in both England and America since the seventeenth century297 -
enjoy, by virtue of this history, only minimal fourth amendment
rights.29 8 Not long after Colonnade, the Court, in United States v.
Biswell,2 99 deemed the firearms industry to be in the same posture as
the alcohol trade. 300  In the physical inspection line of decisions, 30 1 the
Court expressly reaffirmed these conclusions. 02 But this first level
has room for few tenants. The Supreme Court has never added an
industry other than liquor or guns to the list; indeed, it has warned
against its extension. 30 3
Entities subject only to laws of general applicability -level three
entities-are entirely unaffected by Colonnade-Biswell. The mere
fact that firms in an industry are subject to some federal statutes and
regulations is insufficient. All companies engaged in interstate com-
merce must endure federal laws dealing with fair labor standards,
securities, occupational health and safety, and the like. The Supreme
Court has made it clear that more than laws of general applicability
must be involved; a history of stringent supervision exists only when
an industry historically has been supervised in all or nearly all of the
essential features of its operation. 30 4
Level two thus occupies an intermediate position. Industries like
public carriers under the jurisdiction of the ICC or CAB,30 5 dealers
in-but not mere issuers of-stocks and bonds, 308 and businesses
operating under federal licenses and receiving substantial federal
funds307 are subject to considerable vertical regulation. 308  Yet the
296 397 U.S. 72 (1970).
211 See id. at 75-76.
298 See id. at 77.
299 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
1 Id. at 314-16.
m' See text accompanying notes 85-94 supra.
302 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978).
303 Id. at 313-14; see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1973).
311 "The clear import of our cases is that the closely regulated industry of the type Involved In
Colonnade and Biswell is the exception. [Extending it to all industries subject to the Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act] would make it the rule." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at
313. Another way of stating the idea is that horizontal regulation-applying broadly across
many industrial groupings-is insufficient; intensive vertical regulation-in-depth supervision
of one particular industry- is required.
3 See Coopers Express, Inc. v. ICC, 330 F.2d 338, 340-41 (1st Cir. 1964); United States v.
Alabama Highway Express, 46 F. Supp. 450, 453 (N.D. Ala. 1942); B. Schwartz, supra note 3,
at 123-25.
308 See United States v. Mahler, 254 F. Supp. 581, 582-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
30 See Ray v. United States, 374 U.S. 638, 641 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 833 (1967).
308 Thus, such industries partake of some of the characteristics of pervasive oversight. Anyone
entering such a business must be aware of the oversight, see Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S.
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regulation is short of that endured by the alcohol and firearms indus-
tries, and so privacy rights are diluted to only a lesser extent. 30 9
A second consideration is that an inspection demand from an
agency charged with supervising either a historically pervasively regu-
lated or merely substantially regulated industry (levels one and two) is
less likely to exceed the agency's delegated authority. The statutory
powers of such an agency are so comprehensive that extrajurisdic-
tional demands are unlikely. As has been noted about one such
agency, "[i]n view of the broad power of regulation of interstate
public carriers, it is difficult to conceive of a case in which the
Interstate Commerce Commission would be seeking to inspect a rec-
ord or document which would not be relevant to a lawful activity of
the Commission." 310
The third consideration relates to the extent of the public's inter-
est in effective regulation. The very fact of a history of close govern-
mental oversight reflects a judgment by the legislature that an unusu-
ally strong regulatory interest exists with respect to the particular
industry. Both Colonnade and Biswell stressed "the evils at hand" in
the industry as central to the relaxation of strictures against govern-
mental information-gathering. 311  However, "the evils at hand" vary
among the closely regulated industries. Industries subject to economic
regulation present less pressing needs for regulation than do industries
regulated because of their potential effects on health or safet. 3 12
Thus, although easier agency access to private documents is war-
ranted whenever the target of the access demand is a traditionally
closely regulated industry,313 such access should be granted less readily
307, 313 (1978), and thus may be said to "accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their
trade," Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973).
3 See, e.g., CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1976) (rejecting
extension of the Colonnade-Biswell exception to regulated air carriers), Burlington N., Inc. v.
ICC, 462 F.2d 280, 288 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane)
("[S]o long as our [rail] carrier operations are rooted in private enterprise there is a strong
element of privacy in [their important internal papers]."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
310 Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 391 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
690 (1940), quoted in Coopers Express, Inc. v. ICC, 330 F.2d 338, 341 (lst Cir. 1884).
31, Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. at 76. see United States v. Biswell,
406 U.S. at 315-16 ("dose scrutiny of [the gun] traffic is undeniably of central importance to
federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the States in regulating the firearms traffic
within their borders.... Large interests are at stake, and inspection is a crucial part of the
regulatory scheme .... ").
312 One circuit court remarked: "We think that 'the evils at hand'.., in the liquor and gun
trades are not sufficiently analogous to the problems which are likely to arise in a public
transportation industry to justify reliance here on cases dealing with those trades." CAB v.
United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1976) (citation omitted).
30 The reasons for this facilitated access are the privacy, delegation and public regulation
considerations discussed in this Note. Two other justifications are less compelling. First, lan-
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when the basis of the regulation is economic, not health or safety
considerations.
c. Consent by Contract-The federal government annually pur-
chases billions of dollars worth of goods and services from thousands
of private-sector suppliers. 31 4  Uniformly, federal contracts with pri-
vate suppliers include provisions controlling the manner in which the
contractors are to perform and allowing federal agencies access to the
records of the contractors. Both the agency contracting for the goods
or services 315 and the General Accounting Office 316 customarily are
given such access under the terms of the contracts.
guage in some opinions has suggested that "[t]he businessman in a regulated industry in effect
consents to the restrictions placed upon him." Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 260,
271 (1973). But to speak of consent is to engage in fiction. A closely supervised company may
resign itself to regulation as an unpleasant fact of life, but it hardly assents to imposition of the
regulation. When significant rights are at stake, the law should be reluctant to make fictional
ascriptions of consent. The argument is better couched in terms of privacy, delegation, and the
need for regulation.
The second untenable justification for easier access is historical. Some courts adverted to an
analogue of the closely regulated industry factor, to wit, whether the target of the inspection
demand operates in an industry "affected with a public interest." See Bartlett Frazier Co. v.
Hyde, 65 F.2d 350, 351-52 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 654 (1933); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
United States, 15 F.2d 133, 136-37 (7th Cir. 1926); FTC v. Baltimore Grain Co., 284 F. 880,
888-89 (D. Md. 1922), aff'd, 267 U.S. 586 (1925). The difficulty with this concept is its elasticity.
The more interdependent the national economy becomes, the easier it is to define an Industry as
invested with a public interest. Thus, the concept could come to justify virtually plenary agency
access to corporate documents. See 1 Davis II, supra note 38, § 4:21 at 289. However, tie
concept of business affected with a public interest has now disappeared from federal constitu-
tional law. 1 Davis I, supra note 293, at 205; see Olsen v, Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference &
Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 244-46 (1941); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-39 (1934);
Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384, 390 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690
(1940).
314 In 1964, the federal government purchased $65.2 billion of goods and services, $38.2
billion from private contractors. In 1978, its purchases ran to $154.3 billion, $84.1 billion from
private contractors. Employment and Training Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor & Office of
Human Dev. Servs., U.S. Dep't of HEW, Employment & Training Report of the President 386
(1979). These contracts involved 2.6 million private sector employees in 1964, and 3.3 million In
1978. Id. at 388.
315 The first major case espousing the expansive construction of agency access powers, Endi-
cott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943), arose out of a subpoena issued by the
Secretary of Labor for the payroll records of a federal contractor in order to measure the
contractor's compliance with the Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act. For a more recent exam-
ple, see Computer Sciences Can Still Bid on Some Defense Agency Jobs, Wall St. J., Jan. 28,
1981, at 12, col. 3 (Defense Department to receive bids of one contractor only on certification
that the company would provide access to its records and facilities).
316 41 U.S.C. § 254(c) (1976), applicable to most federal agencies, provides in relevant part:
All contracts negotiated without advertising pursuant to authority contained in this Act
shall include a clause to the effect that the [GAO) shall until the expiration of three years
after final payment have access to and the right to examine any directly pertinent books,
documents, papers, and records of the contractor or any of his subcontractors engaged In
the performance of and involving transactions related to such contracts or subcontracts.
10 U.S.C. § 2313(b) (1976) makes similar provision for Department of Defense procurement
contracts.
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Agency demands to inspect the documents of federal contractors
should be examined leniently by the courts when those documents
bear on the provisions of their contracts with the government. The
contractor, in assenting to the provisions of the contract, forfeits any
expectation of privacy as to the documents bearing on its performance
under those provisions. The Supreme Court has remarked: "[Fourth
amendment] rights may be waived. And when petitioner, in order to
obtain the Government's business, specifically agreed to permit in-
spection of his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such claim
to privacy which he otherwise might have had as respects business
documents related to those contracts." 31 7
There are two instances, however, in which a contractor should
be able to avoid production under an agency's document demand.
First, enforcement of the contract term might exceed the agency's
jurisdictional ambit. Here, the target's lack of a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy would not be controlling; the reason for denying
enforcement of the subpoena would be the principle of delegation, not
the fourth amendment. 1 8 Second, the demand might exceed the
scope of the contractual provisions and therefore the target's consent
to access. In this circumstance, the target entity's normal fourth
amendment rights would be undiminished. In the main, this is a
matter of contractual and statutory interpretation not implicating the
themes discussed in this Note.319 A different question, however, is
germane. It is unclear what body is competent to decide when that
scope has been exceeded. Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkinse 2 held
that determination of an agency's range of access under a contract is
317 Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
310 The court in SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 483 F. Supp. 712 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1038 (1980), stated: "In determining whether the CAO's purpose in this case was autho-
rized by the statutes, we must look at the source of the GAO'S power to eamine contractors'
records .... [A]n agency's power to investigate can be exercised only for the purpose for which
the authority was granted." Id. at 720. The court held that the fact that the CAO is an agency of
Congress, not of the executive branch, did not disturb the applicability of the general principles
of administrative law. Id.
119 Nonetheless, these issues hardly are routine and have generated conflicts among lower
federal courts. Compare Bristol Laboratories Div. v. Staats, 620 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 19SO) (per
curiam), aff'd per curlam by an equally divided Court, 101 S. Ct. 2037 (19S). with United
States v. Abbott Laboratories, 597 F.2d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1979), and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Stoats,
574 F.2d 904, 912-14 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978). Judge Pell's strong dissent In
Eli Lilly, 574 F.2d at 918, is particularly telling. Eli Lilly has occasioned substantial commen-
tary, See, e.g., Case Comment, The Comptroller Cencral's Authority to Examine the Private
Business Records of Government Contracts: Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staoats, 92 liarv. L. Rev. 1148
(1979); Note, Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staals: An Undue Expansion of the GAO's Investigatory Power
Under the Access-to-Records Statutes, 74 Nw. U.L. Rev. 122 (1979).
320 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
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primarily for the agency itself. 32' In more recent decisions, though,
reviewing courts have assumed that power of determination them-
selves. 322  Because of the importance of the principle that administra-
tive investigations be subject to effective judicial scrutiny, 32 3 the view
of the recent cases is preferable.
d. Market Control-The extent of market control exercised by
the target of an access demand is relevant to the stringency with
which a court should review the demand for overbreadth. First, large
corporations are not at the core of concern of the fourth amendment.
The Supreme Court has noted that, although corporations have pri-
vacy rights, the central mission of the fourth amendment is to protect
individuals. 32 4  The further a case is removed from searches and
seizures directed against individuals, the less pressing become fourth
amendment concerns. A continuum exists in which privacy interests
weaken as the focus shifts from individuals to small businesses to large
corporations. Thus, the privacy concern applies with less force when
the records of large corporations are sought by federal agencies. 325
321 Id. at 507.
312 See Bristol Laboratories Div. v. Staats, 620 F.2d 17, 18 (2d Cir. 1980) (per curiam), aff'd
per curiam by an equally divided Court, 101 S. Ct. 2037 (1981); United States v. Abbott
Laboratories, 597 F.2d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 1979); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Staats, 574 F.2d 904, 912-14
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 (1978); SmithKline Corp. v. Staats, 483 F. Supp. 712,
720-23 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1038 (1980).
323 See note 158 and text accompanying notes 138-43 supra.
324 See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 338 n.9 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[A]Ithough the Fourth Amendment extends its protection to commercial buildings, the central
importance of protecting residential privacy is manifest."); cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.").
32 The continuum analysis suggested here derives force by analogy to judicial treatment of
the fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court has held that the
privilege is "essentially a personal one, applying only to natural individuals." United States v.
White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944). But, an organization too may claim the privilege if the
institution merely represents "the private or personal interests of its members." Id. at 701. In
separating institutions that may claim the privilege from those that may not "(t]he test . . is
whether one can fairly say under all the circumstances that a particular type of organization has
a character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said to
embody or represent the purely private or personal interests of its constituents, but rather to
embody their common or groups interests only." Id. Under this test, the records of sole proprle -
torships and general partnerships have been held privileged, Schultz v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp.
794, 800 (D.N.J. 1967), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 403 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 961 (1969), while those of limited partnership syndicates, United States v.
Cogan, 257 F. Supp. 170, 173 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), and corporations, see Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963), have been
found unprotected. This treatment approximates the continuum suggested here for fourth
amendment purposes. The analogy between the fourth and fifth amendments is particularly
appropriate in light of repeated observations by the Supreme Court that in the area of agency
inspection of corporate documents the origins and purposes of "the fourth and fifth amendments
run almost into each other." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see Oklahoma
Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 205 (1946).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
[Vol. 56:7429
REASONABLE RELATION REASSESSED
Second, there is a compelling public interest in effective oversight
of the activities of major corporations. It has become a commonplace
that in some respects major corporations exercise virtually as much
control over the lives of American citizens as do units of govern-
ment.326  The very existence of the antitrust laws, for example, re-
flects suspicion about the desirability of vast agglomerations of private
economic power.2  The need to ensure adequate public control of
the power of such organizations must be included in the balance of
interests when large corporations with substantial power over the
markets in which they operate 328 are the targets of agency access
requests.329
3 See Fischer, The Lost Liberals, 194 Harper's Magazine 3S5, 392-93 (1947). See also
Latham, Equality & Power in the Maxwell Memorandum, 40 U. Det. L.J. 457, 463-64 1193.
A substantial body of polling data in recent years has demonstrated considerable public
perception of the dangers of large concentrations of private economic power. One rieu of
polling results found "a general suspicion of [corporate] bigness and concentrated power. Public
opinion makes a clear distinction between big business and small business. showingsympathb for
the latter .... " Regulation, May-June 1979, at 59. Another concluded that -most Americans
believe that business institutions are growing larger and perhaps less responsive to the public
interest" and that the role of government regulation is the use of -one huge entity to fight
another," Regulation, Nov.-Dec. 1978, at 11.
32' Indeed, in recent years, a large number of proposals have been introduced in Congress to
strengthen the antitrust laws, this in response to growing concern about corporate abuses of
power. See Regulation, May-June 1979, at 7-8.
3 In defining market power, courts might avail themselves of the rich body of antitrutt
literature on the subject. See generally L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 74-93
(1977). But, in view of the importance of expedition in deciding subpoena enforcement cases. it
would be well to admit only limited empirical evidence, relying more on rough calculation than
absolute precision.
32 In addition to the justifications for the market power factor already noted, two other
considerations loom. First, the regulatory agencies may be less likely to use their powers abu-
sively against large corporations than small companies. One commentator has argued that the
ICC "has consistently favored the large established trucking companies and insulated them from
competition from smaller truckers" and that similar favoritism toward established companies
pervades the other federal regulatory commissions as well. Schwartz, Crisis in the Commissions.
The Progressive, Aug. 1959, at 11-13. In the time since that argument was advanced. charges
that federal agencies exhibit a massive regulatory bias against competition have not abated. See.
e.g., Moore, Deregulating Surface Freight Transportation, in Promoting Competition in Regu-
lated Markets 68-69 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
Second, large corporations are better able to bear the monetary burdens of producing
documents. Companies endowed with palpable measures of market control may he able to
spread the expenses over a broad segment of society by passing costs through to consumers of its
products. The possibility of loss spreading has figured in the reasoning of legal scholars in other
areas. See, e.g., G. Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents 50-54 (1970) (possibility of loss spreading as
a factor in allocating losses in tort cases); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. Legal Stud. 83, 91-92 (1977) (ability of a
corporation to self-insure against losses through spreading costs as a factor in deciding w'hich
party should bear the loss caused by nonperformance of contracts). But cf. Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 729-35 (1977); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.. 392 U.S.
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2. Application of the Factors
The four factors discussed above are, if present, relevant to deter-
mining the extent of overbreadth permissible in a document de-
mand.330  None of the factors is absolute, however. To illustrate the
481, 489 (1968) (fact that direct purchaser of goods bought at fixed prices passed on extra costs to
its customers is irrelevant to computation of damages for violation of Clayton Antitrust Act). In
addition, should it be forced to swallow the costs of production itself, the large corporation has
the financial wherewithal to absorb the expense with minimum dislocation. This fact was
influential to a district court that upheld against a challenge of burdensomeness extensive FTC
subpoenas directed at six major tobacco manufacturers. FTC v. Carter, 464 F. Stipp. 633, 641
(D.D.C. 1979) ("the costs of compliance are minor relative to the financial positions of these
corporations"), aff'd, 636 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1980). A consideration of this sort appropriately Is
part of the determination of burdensomeness, the final part of the approach recommended here.
See text accompanying notes 373-79 infra.
330 Three other plausible-but ultimately unsatisfactory- factors should be discussed. First,
since the extent of the regulatory interest always is important in document inspection cases, It
would be natural to think that a reviewing court should consider in each case the significance of
the matter under investigation. However, for courts to do so routinely would subvert tie
constitutional allocation of responsibilities between the judicial and executive branches of gov-
ernment. Courts should not substitute their own notions of which matters are important and
which are not for the judgments of the agencies charged with supervision of particular areas.
Moreover, it is not always apparent at the inception of an investigation how great the stakes
ultimately may prove to be.
Second, some have ventured that the level of judicial scrutiny should vary with the type of
power the investigation is designed to support. For example, according to one commentator-
The analysis in Morton Salt [see text accompanying notes 61-66 supra] turns on the need
for broad investigative powers in an administrative agency. Such power can be viewed as
being inherent to an agency's legislative-rulemaking function as distinguished from Its
adjudicatory function. Thus, it can be argued that Morton Salt's reasoning is persuasive
only when an agency is acting in other than an adjudicative function.
Mogel, The Effect of a Claim of Privilege Upon the Subpoena Power of an Administrative Law
Judge, 28 Drake L. Rev. 67, 74-75 (1978) (footnote omitted). A suggestion that agency access
powers should be broader when the agency contemplates later rulemaking than when It Intends
later to issue a complaint would be unappealing. For one thing, the same privacy rights and
concerns about delegation of authority are present in the investigation regardless of what later
action may be taken. Also, an agency may be unsure at the start of the investigation what action
it ultimately will take, or even whether it will proceed to later substantive action at all. And,
when an agency does have an initial inclination, its intention may change during the Inquiry as
unexpected information comes to light. See W. Gellhorn, C. Byse & P. Strauss, Administrative
Law: Cases and Comments 562-65 (7th ed. 1979); 1 Davis I, supra note 293, at 165. Finally,
investigations often entail multiple purposes, some adjudicatory and some not. Id. at 164; see
Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 460 F. Supp. 996, 997 (D.D.C. 1978) (mer.), rev'd on
other grounds, 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
A third suggestion was offered by Justice Murphy: "If the proposed examination under the
subpoena or the proceeding itself would be relatively brief and of a limited scope, any doubt
should ordinarily be resolved in favor of the agency's power. If it promises to be protracted and
burdensome to the party, a more searching inquiry is indicated." Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 516 (1946) (dissenting). This suggestion, for all its appeal to notions of
proportionality, has drawbacks. Agencies would be tempted to parcel each large investigation
into several smaller ones to achieve minimal review in piecemeal fashion. Moreover, small-scale
investigations, as well as large-scale ones, may compromise important privacy rights.
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proposed process, it is helpful to reconsider the facts of some impor-
tant document inspection decisions in light of the factors just adduced.
The discussion that follows is concerned with the overbreadth deter-
mination only; it presupposes that the threshold of materiality devel-
oped earlier in this section has been met.
First, some of the principal "jurisdictional defense" cases are
illustrative. In Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins,33' the subpoena
was addressed to a government contractor. Thus, under the third
factor, because the Secretary of Labor is empowered by statute to
monitor the performance of the contractor, her demand for docu-
ments related to the work done under the contract would likely be
upheld. But in Endicott Johnson the issue was whether the documents
sought were from plants that were doing unrelated work; thus the
third factor alone is not helpful. The other factors must be consulted.
First, unless the plants in dispute were working on the contract, the
company was not obligated by law to maintain the documents sought.
Second, footwear manufacturers are not in a traditionally closely
regulated industry. Third, although Endicott Johnson was a major
foot-wear producer, the market was a relatively competitive one, and
beyond the target corporation's control. For these reasons, there was
nothing to indicate that concerns about agency abuse, privacy, and
delegation of powers were weaker than usual or that the regulatory
interest was stronger. The Supreme Court, therefore, in enforcing the
subpoena without a demonstration that the plants involved were
under the jurisdiction of the Secretary, went too far. It should have
allowed the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the
question of jurisdiction.
A somewhat harder problem was presented by SEC v. Brigadoon
Scotch Distributing Co. 332 To determine whether they had violated
the securities laws in connection with the sale of whiskey warehouse
receipts, the SEC subpoenaed from three whiskey distributors various
customer and employee lists, copies of literature and advertising,
listings of corporate affiliations and officers and shareholders, finan-
cial statements, and names of transactionally involved banks and
lenders. 333 The distributors contended that the SEC lacked jurisdic-
tion because the documents being sold were documents of title to
specific casks of scotch whiskey (arguably not covered by the securities
laws), not whiskey warehouse receipts (covered by the laws) .3 4 Al-
-1 317 U.S. 501 (1943), discussed at text accompanying notes 48-54 supra.
332 480 F.2d 1047 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
Id. at 1050-51.
314 Id. at 1052.
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though conceding that serious jurisdictional questions had been
raised, 335 the court, relying in part on Endicott Johnson, held that it
was for the Commission in the first instance to determine the scope of
its authority and therefore enforced the subpoenasa36
Brigadoon Scotch did not involve required records, government
contractors, or firms with substantial market control. The second
factor, a tradition of close governmental oversight, arguably was
present, however. The Supreme Court has found that traffic in liquor
has long been subjected to close public supervision and inspection. 337
Therefore, judicial leniency in review of administrative subpoenas
directed at whiskey distributors normally would be expected. ' 8
However, in Brigadoon Scotch the subpoenas did not emanate from
one of the agencies charged with the responsibility of moderating "the
evils at hand" 339 in the liquor trade. 340 Thus, the usual significance of
the second factor was substantially diminished in Brigadoon Scotch.
Although liquor dealers may have little expectation of privacy as to
agencies that are part of the regulatory apparatus set up over the
industry, they may justifiably entertain a greater expectation as to
other agencies. Since the SEC is not part of that apparatus, and since
there was serious question whether the target companies were dealing
in securities, the possibility of derogation of the principle of delegation
of administrative power was greater than in most cases involving
closely regulated industries. And, since the investigation did not aim
at the health and safety effects of liquor traffic, the special public
interest that led to close governmental supervision of liquor dealers
was not implicated in the case. On the whole, therefore, the balance
of the factors suggests that the leniency of the court's treatment of the
subpoenas was not warranted. Before the subpoenas were enforced,
the SEC should have been required to demonstrate its jurisdiction
over the practices of the distributors. Document inspection should
have been authorized only as to those records tending to establish the
securities or nonsecurities nature of the documents being sold by the
distributors.341
33 Id.
36 Id. at 1052M54.
337 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970).
38 See generally text accompanying notes 295-313 supra.
339 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970).
340 By contrast, the physical inspection at issue in Colonnade Catering was conducted by the
Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Treasury Department, which has the statutory duty to
superintend the administration of federal excise tax laws in the liquor industry, id. at 72-73.
34' Records relevant to this purpose certainly would have been far fewer than the sum of the
records sought in the Commission's subpoenas. See text accompanying notes 167-70 supra for
discussion of the technique of bifurcated review.
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The "purpose" cases also illustrate the application of the factors
discussed in this section. In CAB v. Frontier Airlines, Inc.,312 the CAB
served a subpoena on a small air carrier, seeking production of all of
the minutes of meetings of the firm's Board of Directors and Executive
Audit Committees over a period of one year.343 The court refused to
enforce the subpoena because the Board never specified the purpose of
its investigation.344 Under the principles developed in this Note, this
holding was in error. Present were two of the four factors: the records
sought were required to be kept by law,345 and the target firm is in an
industry long subject to substantial regulation. Both of these circum-
stances undercut the carrier's expectation of privacy in the records,
diminished the likelihood that the investigation was beyond the
agency's delegated authority, and reflected more than usually compel-
ling public interests in effective regulation. 30 The objectives of the
disclosure of purpose requirement 3 7 were met in Frontier without
disclosure ever occurring: the definition provided by the legal require-
ment that the minutes be kept coupled with the clarity of the CAB's
demand gave Frontier adequate notice of what was sought and, since
all the minutes were within the Board's sphere of authority, disclosure
of purpose was unnecessary to permit the reviewing court to deter-
mine whether the demand was reasonably related to a legitimate
regulatory activity of the Board.
However, had the Board's demand been for records other than
those required to be maintained, the holding in Frontier would have
been correct, despite the presence of the closely regulated industry
factor. Even a closely regulated industry retains some privacy
rights,34 8 and even an agency regulating such an industry may over-
step the bounds of its delegation. Thus, had a history of close supervi-
sion been the only factor present in Frontier, requiring the CAB to
disclose its purpose would have been a reasonable outcome of over-
breadth analysis. It is because this factor was compounded by the
required records factor that the Frontier result was too restrictive.
34 468 F. Supp. 443 (D. Colo. 1979), discussed at text accompanying notes 18693 supra.
3 Id. at 444.
34 Id. at 447.
3- See 14 C.F.R. § 249.13 (1981).
41 See text accompanying notes 289-313 supra.
34 See text accompanying note 183 supra.
38 See CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1976); Burlington N., Inc. v.
ICC, 462 F.2d 280, 288 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
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Two other "purpose" cases, CAB v. United Air Lines, Inc.34' and
FTC v. Texaco, Inc.,350 may be considered in tandem. In United, the
CAB presented a far-reaching subpoena to a large air carrier. The
subpoena was not limited to records required to be maintained, '
and, beyond some intimations that examination of the carrier's politi-
cal campaign contributions may have been one of its intentions, the
Board refused to disclose the purpose of its investigation. 52 Because
of this refusal, the court invalidated the subpoena.3,5 3 In Texaco, the
FTC subpoenaed from major natural gas producers a large volume of
material, including background information such as annual reports,
subsidiaries, officers, customers, net production, and sales volume, as
well as data relating to natural gas reserves, drilling operations, and
the relation between proved natural gas reserves and price rates per-
mitted by the Federal Power Commission. 35 4 Although the investiga-
tion certainly involved the question whether a conspiracy existed
among the producers to underreport proved natural gas reserves, the
FTC insisted that the investigation was not inspired solely by this
purpose, although the Commission refused to define what additional
purposes might have been involved. 35  Despite this sketchy explana-
tion of purpose, the court upheld the subpoenas, with only minor
modifications. 356
Both cases involve in substantial measures the factors discussed in
this section. As to a tradition of close regulation, air carriers, of
course, are subject to pervasive oversight by the CAB.a5 7 And, at the
time of Texaco, the Federal Power Commission exercised significant
supervision, including rate-making, over the natural gas industry,358
39 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976), discussed at text accompanying notes 177-85 supra.
-- 555 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977), discussed at text
accompanying notes 195-204 supra.
3-1 See 542 F.2d at 395 for the dimensions of the CAB's subpoena.
352 Id. at 395-96.
3 Id. at 402-03.
31 555 F.2d at 868-69.
3 See id. at 874-75.
36 Id. at 875-77, 885.
3s This pervasive control is being phased out gradually. See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1302, 1305-1308, 1371-1374,
1376, 1378, 1379, 1382, 1384, 1386, 1389, 1461, 1471, 1473, 1482, 1482a, 1490, 1504, 1551,
1552, 1711, 1729 (Supp. III 1979)) (termination of Civil Aeronautics Board and transfer of
certain functions to other regulatory bodies, to be completed by December 31, 1985).
3-" Indeed, Texaco developed out of actions taken in reaction to an earlier FFC ratemaklng
proceeding. See 555 F.2d at 869-70. Congress has since transferred the PC's ratemaklng power
in the area of natural gas to the Department of Energy. Department of Energy Organization
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, §§ 301(b), 402(a)(1)(C), 91 Stat. 565 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
7151(b), 7172(a)(1)(C) (Supp. III 1979)).
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although its powers were somewhat less than those of the CAB over
airlines. 35 9  This shortfall, however, is offset by another factor in
Texaco arguing for lenient scrutiny of the agency's demand. The
FTC's subpoenas included virtually all important producers of natural
gas in the United States. 360 The market control factor, therefore, was
more strongly present in Texaco than in most subpoena enforcement
cases.
361
Thus, on the basis of the factors, there is strong justification for
viewing at least part of the subpoenas with favor. In each case,
production should have been ordered at least to the extent that: (1) the
information sought was located in records required by the CAB or the
Federal Power Commission, and (2) the documents were related to
the intimated purposes of monitoring campaign contributions and
checking for possible underestimation of reserves. As to any docu-
ments the production of which would not have been required by these
guidelines, the circuit courts in the two cases should have remanded to
the appropriate district courts to allow the agencies additional oppor-
Much of the complexity of Texaco resulted from the fact that the FTC investigation covered
much of the same ground that earlier had been traversed by the FPC. An issue of collateral
estoppel thus arose, see 555 F.2d at 877-81 (majority opinion) and 923-35 (Wilkey, J.. dissent-
ing). This Note does not consider the effects of this issue.
The prior FPC proceedings had concluded that the producers were not underreporting
reserves. In allowing the FTC to reexamine that issue, the Texaco decision seemed to ignore that
the expertise of the FTC was undeniably greater than that of the FTC in the technical aspects of
the natural gas industry. See id. at 928 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Texaco, therefore, may illustrate
a phenomenon discussed by Professor Richard Stewart. See Stewart, The Reformation of Ameri-
can Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1669 (1975). Professor Stewart argues that the
traditional model of the administrative process, in which expert agencies receive delegated
powers from Congress and are subject to judicial review to ensure that the delegation is not
exceeded, see id. at 1671-76, is breaking down. It is being replaced, he contends, by a pluralistic
model in which all relevant interests are represented in agency proceedings on particular
matters, see id. at 1711-813. If the intent of Texaco was to broaden the traditional process of
regulation of the natural gas industry by allowing consumer interests, through their institutional
representative, the FTC, to participate in reserve estimation and therefore (because prices
allowed depend in part on reserve estimations) indirectly in rate-setting, the Texaco decision
may be in the spirit of the pluralistic, interests-representation model described by Professor
Stewart.
35 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976) (FPC) (superseded by transfer of ratemaking for
natural gas companies to Department of Energy in 1977) with 49 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1325 (1976 &
Supp. III 1979) (CAB).
360 See 555 F.2d at 862.
31 In addition to the reasons for facilitated agency access usually associated with the market
power factor, see text accompanying notes 324-29 supra, the fact that the subpoenas in Texaco
blanketed the important producers means that there was less likelihood that any producer would
be harmed, relative to its important competitors, by either production or the possibility of later
disclosure by the agency of the information produced.
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tunities to explain why the documents were reasonably related to
investigations within the agencies' powers.3 62
The "particularization of relevance" cases30 3 provide a final fer-
tile field for illustrating the application of the factors to be balanced in
subpoena enforcement cases. In Adams v. FTC,30 4 the FTC issued
administrative subpoenas against a large dairy concern and three
retail grocery chains. No required records, closely regulated industry,
or government contracts were involved. The companies, although
sizable, were not in positions to dominate their markets. Thus, there
were no urgent reasons either to discount the privacy and delegation
principles or to exalt the need for regulation; the balance of factors
demanded strict review of the breadth of the Commission's sub-
poenas. The court properly examined with care the probable rele-
vance of each category of document sought, limiting or denying en-
forcement as to those categories for which the Commission had not
established a probable need. 3 5
In CAB v. Hermann36 1 and FTC v. Crafts,337 the Supreme Court
took a different tack, enforcing administrative subpoenas without
evaluating the extent to which the agencies had shown the likely
relevance of each category of document sought to a regulatory pur-
pose proper for the agency to pursue. Yet, in Crafts, none of the four
factors triggering relaxed scrutiny was present. Moreover, in that
case, the FTC demands were quite broad, 368 and there was substantial
doubt that the FTC had authority to regulate the industry involved. 0
The balance of factors was strongly in favor of more stringent review
of the FTC's subpoena than the Supreme Court was prepared to
compel. As in Adams, the agency should have been held to a burden
of proving the probable relevance to a proper purpose of the particu-
lar documents it sought to inspect.
362 This was the approach followed in Southern Ry. v. ICC, 553 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
In this case, the ICC sought to examine records, many or all of which were not required by law,
of a railroad without disclosing its purpose and without crystallizing the scope of Its demand.
The circuit court, instead of following United's approach of denying enforcement, remanded the
case to the district court to afford the Commission another opportunity to explain the relevance
of the documents. See id. at 1349-50.
3'3 See text accompanying notes 207-36 supra.
34 296 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962), discussed at text accompa-
nying notes 211-15 supra.
36' See 296 F.2d at 867-71.
3- 353 U.S. 322 (1957) (per curiam), rev'g Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1956),
discussed at text accompanying notes 218-28 supra.
30 355 U.S. 9 (1957) (per curiam), rev'g Crafts v. FTC, 244 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1957),
discussed at text accompanying notes 229-34 supra.
3" See 244 F.2d at 884-86, 894-95.
-19 See id. at 891-94.
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The Court was on somewhat firmer ground in Hermann. There,
the target company, an air carrier, was in an industry traditionally
subject to close economic regulation. And the subpoena, including
"'practically all records, books and documents" over a 38-month pe-
riod,370 inevitably embraced some required records. However, some
countervailing considerations existed. Although subject to close super-
vision, the company retained some privacy rights.37 1  Moreover, on
the market power criterion, the target company could not dictate
behavior in the market or pass on the costs of producing the docu-
ments. 372 The balancing of these factors performed by the Supreme
Court was not sufficiently careful. A better approach would have
been to enforce the subpoena as to any required records involved, but
to remand the request for other documents to the lower courts with
instructions that the CAB be compelled to demonstrate specifically the
relevance of these other documents to a regulatory purpose the Board
was empowered to pursue.
C. Burdensomneness
Complying with document inspection demands sometimes can
impose significant hardship in monetary expense and loss of confiden-
tiality and managerial autonomy on target individuals and com-
panies.173 To a limited extent, the overbreadth factors discussed in
the preceding subsection consider such hardships.3"4 But a more
systematic and comprehensive calculation of these costs than the over-
breadth factors alone can provide is necessary. This Note, therefore,
proposes a third and residual step of judicial scrutiny in subpoena
enforcement proceedings: upon a showing by the target entity that it
would suffer real and appreciable hardship were it to comply, the
court should order production only subject to adequate protective
conditions.
Wo 237 F.2d at 361.
37 Although the privacy rights of closely regulated companies are limited, they still do exist.
See CAB v. United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 1976); Burlington N., Inc. v. ICC.
462 F.2d 280, 288 (D.C. Cir.) (Leventhal, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en bane). cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 891 (1972).
'7 Indeed, the approval of the CAB itself would have been required for any attempt by the
airline to revise its rates. 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
3 See text accompanying notes 103-15 supra.
374 See text accompanying notes 244, 1-46 supra. Especially important are the required
records, see text accompanying notes 280-94 supra, and market power, see tent accompanying
notes 324-29 supra, factors.
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The proposed step better guards against undue burden than does
the reasonable relation rule as currently interpreted. Surely, courts
are now able to do anything that they could do under this proposed
third step.37 5 The difference, however, is that the measure suggested
here would accord burdensomeness full stature as part of the constitu-
tionally mandated balancing of all interests37 6 and thus would guar-
antee its consideration. In contrast, burdensomeness has no formal
and assured place in the current reasonable relation rule; at most, it
now is a matter of equitable discretion. 377 This has two conse-
quences: (1) there is no guarantee that compliance hardships will be
considered at all; and (2) when considered, the target often must meet
extremely stringent conditions of proof. 378
To prevent excessive inhibition of valid regulation, however, the
step of scrutiny proposed here would be subject to three limitations.
First, the target entity should bear the burden of establishing onerous-
ness. 379  Second, the fact that some burden-no matter how small-
would be involved would not warrant judicial intervention. To avoid
dilatory arguments by target entities, the court should attend to only
real and appreciable hardships. Finally, the proper remedy for such
hardships would be not to deny enforcement of the subpoena but to
condition production on mitigation of the hardships. The remedy
should be flexible, fashioned according to the burden. When the
concern is financial oppression, cost sharing may be in order. For
confidentiality concerns, orders limiting those to whom the agency
may further disclose produced documents are appropriate, as may be
notice requirements allowing targets to challenge in court any further
disclosure. For concerns that document retrieval or removal for exam-
3" See text accompanying notes 117-21 supra.
37' See text accompanying notes 127-29 supra.
37 See text accompanying notes 122-25 supra.
3" See text accompanying notes 131-34 supra.
3" The step proposed here would disturb the reasoning of SEC v. OKC Corp., 474 F. Supp.
1031 (N.D. Tex. 1979), but, because the burden of proof would be on the target, not its result. In
OKC, the target argued that compliance would have cost it $100,000. Id. at 1036. Tie court
rejected the burdensomeness argument in part because "(t]he general rules are well established
that expense alone does not render a subpoena unreasonable and that the recipient of a subpoena
duces tecum is required to bear the costs of compliance." Id. This view, of course, would be
vacated by formal adoption of burdensomeness scrutiny, which would make no assumption In
advance as to whether sufficient expense, even standing alone, could be unduly burdensome.
Yet, OKC's result was correct. The $100,000 estimate was supported by an affidavit that was so
"[l]aced with qualifications that indicate a lack of personal knowledge [that) tile affidavit
tend[ed] to support the view that OKC itself is not certain how burdensome compliance will be."
Id. at 1036 n.6. OKC, therefore, could not sustain its burden of proof. The burdezlsomeness
scrutiny suggested in this Note is designed to guard against actual oppression, not mere fancy or
conjecture.
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ination may paralyze management, inspection may be ordered on the
target's premises or staggered schedules of production may be im-
posed.
D. Comparison with Prior Document Inspection Doctrines
In its response to the tension between the regulatory interest on
the one hand and the values of privacy and delegation on the other,
this Note takes a position between those of the early cases3s° and the
current decisions.38' It better recognizes legitimate public need for
regulation by dispensing with the highly inhibiting doctrinesas2 of the
early line of decisions.
The approach recommended here differs from the current expan-
sive application of the reasonable relation rule in two respects. First, it
furnishes more detailed elaboration of its general precepts, thus mini-
mizing the likelihood of decisional inconsistency. Second, it better
safeguards privacy rights and the principle of delegation. The gener-
ally followed elaboration of the reasonable relation rule, the Morton
Salt formulation, 383 attempts to protect these values in three ways,
each of which is achieved as well by the standards proposed here. s
And, the approach suggested in this Note provides three protections
unmatched by the current approach. It allows extrajurisdictional or
unreasonable document demands to be meaningfully challenged at
the subpoena enforcement proceeding, that is, at a stage early enough
to avert harms that otherwise would accrue. It affords more precise
guidance as to particularization of the request, specification of the
purpose, and degree of fit between request and purpose, thereby
minimizing the effect of the policy orientation of individual judges.
Finally, it guarantees exacting consideration of burdensomeness by
elevating that element to formal constitutional stature.
CONCLUSION
The reasonable relation standard is firmly established as the
litmus by which the validity of administrative subpoenas for docu-
ments is measured. The bare words "reasonable relation," however,
m See text accompanying notes 19-36 supra.
3s See text accompanying notes 47-73 supra.
3 See text accompanying notes 37-45 supra.
3'3 See text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
3" The condition that the inquiry be within the agency's authority to undertake is subsumed
under the threshold of materiality and also is reflected in the overbreadth factors. The com-
mands that the subpoena be not too indefinite and that the information sought be reasonably
relevant are part of the overbreadth analysis.
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are empty of content. If used as a mere incantation, the phrase can be
employed to justify starkly inconsistent results. And, if invoked to
symbolize a rigid philosophy, it can be used to subvert vital public
regulatory needs on the one hand or important privacy rights and key
restraints on administrative lawlessness on the other.
It is essential, therefore, to give more specific content to the
reasonable relation standard. This Note attempts to achieve this end
by focusing attention on the presence or absence in each case of a set
of factors derived from the underlying interests that must be balanced
when federal regulatory agencies attempt to gain access to private
documents.
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